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CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
GREGORY A. ADAMSKI*
STEPHEN B. ENGELMAN**
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
long maintained a laudable reputation for its receptiveness to civil rights
and civil liberties claims.1 Over the years, the court has been a leader
in the protection and promotion of constitutional entitlements.2 It is interest-
ing to note, however, that the circuit's generally "liberal" propensities do not
extend into all matters of constitutional concern. During its recent term, the
court was particularly vigorous in its vindication of expression, welfare, and
housing rights, but was decidedly reluctant to project itself into the controver-
sial areas of prisoner 3 and employment4 rights. Understandably, many
* Associate, Winston & Strawn; member of the Illinois Bar; J.D., Catholic
University of America.
** J.D., UIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Eglit, Fritzsche & Muller, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 51 Cm.-
KENT L. REv. 337 (1974).
2. Some significant Seventh Circuit decisions on civil rights include: Haines v.
Kerner, 427 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1970); Clark v. Universal Builders, 501 F.2d 324 (7th
Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973); Slate
v. McFetridge, 484 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th
Cir. 1973).
3. With the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Wolff v. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), prisoner rights has temporarily subsided as a topic of major
controversy on the appellate level. Limiting its decision to prospective applicability, the
Wolff Court held that due process in prison disciplinary proceedings requires that
adequate written notice of the alleged offenses be given to the accused inmate, that the
fact finders prepare and submit a written statement as to the evidence relied on and their
reasons for any disciplinary action, and that, absent unusual circumstances, the prisoner
be allowed to call witnesses and present evidence. The Supreme Court noted that due
process does not demand the assistance of counsel or confrontation and cross-examina-
tion procedures. 418 U.S. at 567-70.
In a very real sense, Wolff conclusively resolved serious constitutional questions that
have inundated district and appellate courts for years. The debate over due process in
the administration of internal prison discipline created much confusion. Its resolution in
Wolff is most welcome and hopefully foreshadows an era of increased penal responsibili-
ty and decreased prisoner litigation.
As a result of Wolff, the Seventh Circuit's prisoner decisions offer no interpretation
worthy of comment. Seven opinions deal with Wolff issues and are distinctly undistin-
guished. E.g., LaBatt v. Twomey, 513 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975) (due process not
required prior to imposing restrictive status institutional deadlock in emergency situa-
tion); Carroll v. Sielaff, 514 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975) (loss of good time may be
"grievous loss" requiring due process hearing); Aikens v. Lash, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.
1975) (due process required in transferring inmate from reformatory to prison segrega-
tion unit); Edwards v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 514 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1975) (pre-
Wolff loss of good time does not require full due process hearing); Black v. Brown, 513
F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1975) (pre-Wolff isolation requires opportunity to explain actions
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ambiguities were created in the circuit's treatment of civil rights. However,
as developed herein, these disparities are often attributable to the court's
composition and its limited responses to the specific issues that it confronted,
and not due to a general trend of constitutional interpretation on particular
issues.
This article examines and reviews the circuit's civil rights-civil liberties
rulings of the past term and draws conclusions concerning the court's current
posture and attitudes. Among the topics discussed are decisions on first
amendment freedoms, privacy rights, fourteenth amendment protections in
employment, welfare, and housing, and public official immunity.
One important generalization must be made at the outset. Reviewing
the circuit's fifty-plus civil rights decisions, it is eminently clear that any
genuinely aggrieved individual will receive a "day in court." In sixteen of
the twenty-six cases where the trial court dismissed for failure to state an
actionable claim or entered summary judgment and the case was subsequent-
subject to discipline); Thomas v. Pate, 516 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1975); United States ex
rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1975) (not retroactive, but pre-Wolff still
requires some due process in prison disciplinary action); and Burbank v. Twomey, 520
F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1975) (Wolff requires statement of reasons prior to imposition of
discipline).
The remaining prisoner cases merely reaffirm established theories of the extent of
constitutional rights in prison. E.g., Chapman v. Kleindienst, 507 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir.
1974) (disciplinary action taken because of prisoner's refusal to handle pork on religious
grounds may be a violation of free exercise of religion); Bickham v. Cannon, 516 F.2d
885 (7th Cir. 1975) ("customary" procedure of removing prisoner from honor farm to
administrative isolation pending hearing on possession of unauthorized property not a
violation of due process); Bach v. Coughlin, 508 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1974) (prison postal
regulation restriction prohibiting unlimited free postage not unreasonable); and Bonner
v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975) (prison regulation authorizing "shakedown
search" not a violation of fourth amendment rights against unreasonable search and
seizure).
4. In its 1974-1975 term, the Seventh Circuit was confronted with a number of
"employment" cases. The import of several of these opinions is significant and has been
reserved for textual discussion. In the area of equal employment opportunity, however,
the court's decisions were procedural in nature, uniformly uninteresting, and may be
summarized as follows: Caro v. Schultz, 521 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1975) (federal em-
ployees are entitled to a full district court evidentiary hearing of Title VII claims
even if, prior to filing suit, the employees have exhausted all administrative remedies
with adverse results); Gibson v. Kroger Co., 506 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1974) (as a juris-
dictional prerequisite to filing a civil action by a private plaintiff under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must receive a right-to-sue notice from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and that notice must be attached to and pleaded
in the civil complaint); Adams v. Brinegar, 521 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975) (section 717
(c) of the 1972 EEOA, which allows federal employees to bring civil suits for employ-
ment discrimination, applies to any claim pending before the EEOC as of March 24,
1972, the date of the enabling statute's enactment); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp.,
507 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1974) (direct assignment to federal magistrates of Title VII
civil actions is impermissible under the applicable law, absent a deliberate finding by
the district court that a specific case cannot be brought to trial within 4 months after
issue is joined).
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ly appealed, the court found error and reversed and remanded for a full
hearing on the merits. 5 It would be too much, however, to assert that the
5. The sixteen cases remanded include: Keenon v. Conlisk, 507 F.2d 1259 (7th
Cir. 1974) (class action alleging sex discrimination in Chicago Police Department
practice of transporting all female arrestees to Central Headquarters for processing
rather than processing at district stations as is done with male arrestees); Black v.
Brown, 513 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1975) (prisoner action alleging denial of due process in
not being allowed to explain actions during prison disciplinary hearing); Thomas v. Pate,
516 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1975) (prisoner action alleging denial of due process during a
1963-64 prison disciplinary hearing); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.
1975) (prisoner action alleging violation of property rights and interference with free
access to courts when "shakedown search" resulted in loss of trial transcript); LaBatt v.
Twomey, 513 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975) (prisoner actions alleging denial of various
constitutional rights as a result of restricted status during nine day institutional dead-
lock); Chapman v. Kleindeinst, 507 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1974) (prisoner action alleging
punitive segregation for refusal to handle pork in violation of prisoner's right to free ex-
ercise of religion as a Black Muslim); Carroll v. Sielaff, 514 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975)
(prisoner action alleging denial of due process because of failure to provide hearing prior
to prison transfer which resulted in loss of compensatory "good time"); Spence v. Staras,
507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974) (civil rights action to recover damages occasioned by death
of state mental hospital inmate as a result of beatings incurred from other inmates);
Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1974) (action alleg-
ing denial of first and fourteenth amendment rights as a result of failure to renew con-
tract of non-tenured teacher); Nickerson v. Thompson, 504 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974)
(action alleging denial of equal protection by school officials in failing to institute and
properly administer program for "special education" as required by state statute); Friend-
ship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975) (action brought by medical clinic challenging constitu-
tionality of abortion services regulations); Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir.
1974) (civil rights action brought by black couple alleging race discrimination in denial
of apartment lease); Bums v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975) (action alleging
violation of first and fourteenth amendment rights resulting from dismissal as Deputy
Sheriff because of political party affiliation); Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1975) (action alleging inadequacy of internal police disciplinary procedures and investi-
gations of police brutality violated civil rights); Lavin v. Illinois High School Ass'n, No.
74-1829 (7th Cir., Aug. 29, 1975) (action alleging sex discrimination in denying women
right to compete in high school varsity athletics); and Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d
1057 (7th Cir. 1975) (action alleging cruel and unusual punishment and violation of
civil rights in conditions of and commission to solitary confinement at federal prison
in Atlanta, Georgia). See also Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th
Cir. 1975); Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir.
1975).
The ten cases in which the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a suit include:
Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1974) (challenging constitutionality and
application of police regulation prohibiting use of office for political purposes); Gibson v.
Kroger Co., 506 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975) (dismissal
of employment discrimination suit due to failure to properly allege and file EEOC letter
giving plaintiff right to sue); Blankner v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.
1974) (dismissal of suit alleging conspiracy to condemn land for private purposes on
grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata); Rhodes v. City of Chicago, 516 F.2d
1373 (7th Cir. 1975) (no federal jurisdiction over suit alleging inadequate compensation
for land taken by eminent domain); Sheehan v. Scott, 520 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1975)
(class action alleging unconstitutionality of ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3(b) (1973) in
relation to activities of habitually truant children); Ad-kins v. Underwood, 520 F.2d 890
(7th Cir. 1975) (alleging denial of due process when Illinois Supreme Court reversed
judgment of lower court in civil action); Hansen v. Ahligrimm, 520 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.
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federal district courts are required to hear every properly docketed lawsuit.
Acutely aware of the bludgeoning caseloads of its district courts, the circuit is
often as practical as it is "liberal." Recognizing that every claimant is
entitled to a threshold opportunity to be heard, the court has been increas-
ingly aware of the existence and availability of conflict-resolution forums
other than the federal courts6 and has utilized these devices, where appropri-
ate, to check federal intervention in matters of state or local concern.7
1975) (alleging due process violation as result of alleged conspiracy between state court
judge and plaintiff's ex-wife's attorney); Bach v. Coughlin, 508 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.
1974); Edwards v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 514 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1975);
and Bickham v. Cannon, 516 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1975) (noted at note 3 supra). To a
great extent this apparent receptive approach to constitutional allegations accounts for
the Seventh Circuit's "liberal" reputation.
6. "The state courts are as firmly bound by the constitution . . . as is this [fed-
eral] court and [the proper] forum for the enforcement of any constitutional rights that
may have been violated is in the . . . state courts with the right of ultimate determina-
tion by the Supreme Court of the United States." Blankner v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d
1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 1974), quoting Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 6-7 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967). For other examples where the Seventh Circuit
recommends the availability of another forum, see Rhodes v. City of Chicago, 516 F.2d
1373 (7th Cir. 1975) (state courts); Gibson v. Kroger Co., 506 F.2d 647 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975) (EEOC). See also Carroll v. Sielaff, 514
F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975). Compare Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504
F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1974); Nickerson v. Thompson, 504 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974).
7. Judge Stevens was the court's most vocal and articulate advocate of restrictive
federal authority in local controversies. In Schreiber v. Lugar, 518 F.2d 1099 (7th Cir.
1975), a suit seeking to enjoin the construction of an Indianapolis, Indiana sports arena,
Judge Stevens firmly rejected the theory, well established since Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886), that an arbitrary and capricious violation of state law by state officials
deprives aggrieved parties of their rights to the equal protection under the law: "If this
expansive theory is adequate to create federal jurisdiction over this dispute, federal judges
surely have bootstraps that will enable them to stand on their own shoulders. The civil
rights claim is frivolous." Schreiber v. Lugar, 518 F.2d at 1105. Likewise, in Bonner v.
Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), a prisoner suit where it was alleged that
plaintiff's legal papers and transcripts were stolen by guards during an otherwise-lawful
"shakedown search," Judge Stevens noted:
It seems to us that there is an important difference between a challenge
to an established state procedure as lacking in due process and a property dam-
age claim arising out of the misconduct of state officers. In the former situa-
tion the facts satisfy the most literal reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition against "State" deprivations of property; in the latter situation,
however, even though there is action "under color of" state law sufficient to
bring the amendment into play, the state action is not necessarily complete.
For in a case such as this the law of Illinois provides, in substance, that the
plaintiff is entitled to be made whole for any loss of property occasioned by
the unauthorized conduct of the prison guards. We may reasonably conclude,
therefore, that the existence of an adequate state remedy to redress property
damage inflicted by state officers avoids the conclusion that there has been any
constitutional deprivation of property without due process of law within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This is not to suggest that the plaintiff in a § 1983 action must exhaust
his state remedies before seeking federal relief. Rather, it seems to us that the
availability of an adequate state remedy for a simple property damage claim
avoids any constitutional violation. This result is entirely consistent with the
basic statutory purposes as explained in Monroe v. Pape. There is simply no
need to provide a federal tort remedy for property damage caused by the negli-
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Conversely, where special protection of particular rights is believed to be
warranted, the Seventh Circuit will not only assume jurisdiction over the
case, but will often act and comment beyond the controversy directly
confronting it.s
FIRST AMENDMENT
Of all the various civil rights and liberties, the Seventh Circuit has been
most zealous in its protection of the first amendment freedom of speech.
Often interpolating far beyond the issues presented for decision, the court is
well known as a vigorous defender of free expression.
Particularly significant last term was its decision in Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer.9 There, an association of Chicago attorneys challenged
the constitutionality of the "no-comment" or "gag" rules of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 10
The rules prohibited lawyers from making public comment on pending
civil and criminal litigation where such statements were "reasonably likely to
interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the administration of justice."
In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiffs argued that this form of speech
regulation was vague, overbroad, and unduly restrictive of their first amend-
ment freedoms. 1' Fundamentally, then, Chicago Council of Lawyers raised
basic inquiries concerning the relationship between an attorney's free speech
rights and a party's entitlement to a fair trial.
Evaluating and balancing the rights and interests involved, the district
gence of state agents if a state remedy is not only adequate in theory but also
readily available in practice.
This analysis is consistent with the fact that the federal remedy provided
by § 1983 is supplementary to whatever state remedy may exist for constitu-
tional violations. The comment to that effect in Monroe v. Pape rested on
the premise that a constitutional violation had occurred; in that situation the
availability of a state remedy could not foreclose the supplementary federal
remedy. In this case, however, we are persuaded that the availability of tradi-
tional and adequate state procedures for the redress of ordinary property dam-
age tort claims forestalls the conclusion that there has been any deprivation
of plaintiff's property without due process of law within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In short, no federal right was violated by defendants'
alleged negligence.
Id. at 1319-20.
8. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975). See
also Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1975).
9. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
10. U.S. DIST. CT. RULES, N.D. ILL., CRiM. R. 1.07; ABA DISCIPLINARY R. No.
7-107.
11. Vagueness and overbreadth exist wherever a statute or rule does not adequately
apprise one of the conduct which is prohibited and which sweeps within its proscription
conduct that is constitutionally protected. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972); Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
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court, by its Executive Committee, found that its "reasonable likelihood" test
was the proper standard for reviewing comments by counsel and dismissed
the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.12
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the rules were overbroad and an
unjustifiable invasion of first amendment rights.
Recognizing that trial courts are obliged "to take all reasonable means
to ensure a fair trial to every litigant" and that "there is a place and need for
specific [disciplinary] provision in properly drawn rules,' 1 3 the Seventh
Circuit began its analysis by observing that, where restraints are placed upon
speech, "the limitation . . .must be no greater than is necessary or essen-
tial to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.' 4
Without hesitation, the court concluded that the "per se proscription" of
comments "reasonably likely" to interfere with or prejudice a civil or criminal
trial was overbroad and constitutionally infirm.15
In lieu of the impermissible standard, the court fashioned its own test,
stating that "[o]nly those comments that pose a 'serious and imminent threat'
12. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689, 696-97 (N.D. Ill.
1974). Noting that the gag rules neither prohibit all speech nor impair the public's right
to know, the district court asserted that participating attorneys did not necessarily have a
proper interest in publicly discussing matters not of record that could affect the outcome
of litigation. It balanced the right of trial counsel to comment on pending proceed-
ings against the right of individual defendants and society to a fair and impartial trial,
and found the contextual interests in free speech were "neither compelling nor evident."
Id. at 696. On the supremacy of the right to a fair trial over that of free speech the
district court pointed out that the Supreme Court has held that the right to a fair trial
takes precedence over other constitutional guarantees. Id., citing Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 540-41 (1965). But in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), the
Court stated that none of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are more important or
substantial than any other, each being necessary to ensure a free society. The ABA
committee organized to study the need for, and form of, rules limiting trial publicity
articulated that the "Supreme Court has refused to assert the primacy of any part of the
Bill of Rights over any other part, but instead has consistently treated them as equal."
RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL ABA INFO. MANUAL at 83 (1969). Professor Barnes posits that
"freedom of speech and press and the right to an impartial trial are in reality co-
extensive, and each necessary for the existence of the other," such that any distinction
between the two is artificial. Barnes, A Changing View Toward Trial by Newspaper,
16 OKLA. L. REv. 337 (1963). See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95-6 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Note, Gag
Rule and Free Speech, 51 CHI.-KENr L. REv. 597 (1974).
13. 522 F.2d at 247, 251, citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS
(1968); COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., REPORT OF TIm COMMITTEE ON TIH OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM
ON THE FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS ISSUE (1968); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF N.Y., SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL, FINAL REPORT and RECOMMEN-
DATIONS (1967); AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMM.
REPORT, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967); Barist, The First Amendment And Regula-
tion of Prejudicial Publicity-An Analysis, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 425 (1968).
14. 522 F.2d at 249, quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
15. Id. at 251.
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of interference with the fair administration of justice can be constitutionally
proscribed.' 1 6  This formula is rooted in Chase v. Robson17 and In re
Oliver,' two recent Seventh Circuit decisions which discussed the constitu-
tionality of judicial discipline of attorneys for extrajudicial comments on
pending lawsuits and which held:
[Blefore a trial court can limit defendants' and their attorneys'
exercise of first amendment rights of freedom of speech, the record
must contain sufficient specific findings by the trial court estab-
lishing that defendants' and their attorneys' conduct is "a serious
and imminent threat" to the administration of justice."' 9
Since Dennis v. United States20 and its implied rejection of the "clear
and present danger" test as a yardstick for determining the extent of first
amendment protections, 2' courts and commentators have struggled to achieve
an acceptable understanding of the free speech guarantee. 22  Dennis
16. Id. at 249.
17. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970), involving a blanket order prohibiting counsel
from making any case-related extra-judicial statement during the pendency of a criminal
trial.
18. 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971), concerning an order prohibiting any comment
during the pendency of a civil trial.
19. 435 F.2d at 1061. Both Chase and Oliver held the court-imposed orders
overbroad because, as blanket restrictions, they failed to distinguish between speech that
would not have a prejudicial effect on the fair administration of justice and speech that
would have such prejudicial effect. But in Chase, the court specifically refused to rule
whether a reasonable likelihood standard could be used to measure the limiting scope of
free speech. And in Oliver, the majority opinion noted that there was support for the
"reasonable likelihood" standard when dealing with criminal jury trials.
20. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
21. First enunciated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) and finally
adopted in Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937), the "clear and present danger test"
was the standard by which courts measured the extent to which speech and other forms
of expression could be suppressed for the sake of a greater common good. In Dennis,
where the Smith Act conviction of Communist Party leaders in New York was affirmed,
the Court asserted that use of the Schenck (danger) test would bar effective government
action until it was too late:
[Preventing] overthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly
a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Indeed, this
is the ultimate value for a society, for if any society cannot protect its very
structure from armed internal attack it must follow that no subordinate value
can be protected. If, then, this interest may be protected, the literal problem
which is presented is what has been meant by the phrase 'clear and present
danger' of the utterance bringing about the evil within the power of Congress
to punish.
Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Government may
act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been
weighed and the signal is awaited.
341 U.S. at 509-10. See Corwin, Bowing Out 'Clear and Present Danger', 27 NOTRE
DAME LAwYER 325 (1952); Comment, The Clear and Present Danger Standard: Its
Present Viability, 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 93 (1971).
22. Compare Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) with Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951). See BERus, FREEDoM, VIRTUE AND Tm FIRsT AMENDMENT 72(1957); Strong, Fifty Years Of Clear and Present Danger, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 13; Em-
erson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963);
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on The Central Meaning of the First
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laid the ground rules and facilitated the emergence of a balancing approach
by stating that "[i]n each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the
'evil', discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger."' 23  The results of this struggle have
been frustrating and inconclusive. 24
Chicago Council of Lawyers does much to increase and little to clarify
the post-Dennis confusion. The opinion devotes only three paragraphs to
the issue of what standard should apply. The circuit chose not to refute or
even review the district court's logic and citation of cases. Rather, it merely
concluded that the right to a fair trial is "the most fundamental of all
freedoms" and that where conflicts arise between that right and counsel's
freedom of speech, "the right to a fair trial . . . must take precedence," if
the lawyer's statements "are apt to seriously threaten the integrity of the
judicial process."'25
Amendment, 1964 Sup. Cr. REV. 191; FREUNAL, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1961); KKiSLOV, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL FREEDOM (1968).
Between 1951 and 1971, the clear and present danger standard was found spe-
cifically unsuitable in dealing with free speech and libel (Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952); see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964))
or obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and was in fact used
in only one majority opinion, Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), where a
contempt conviction for statements allegedly made to interfere with the due administra-
tion of justice was reversed.
23. 341 U.S. at 510.
24. Determining the point at which freedom of expression ceases to be constitution-
ally protected through the probability or improbability of the occurrence of certain
conduct is not the same as determining at what point that conduct threatens the existence
of organized society. Once the gravity of the evil is discounted by its probability, it must
be ascertained whether the invasion is justified. This decision is made by balancing the
respective interests involved and the balancing technique emasculates any test as a means
of delineating the scope of free speech. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581-
92 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
But balancing is the logical extension of the modified "danger" test urged in Dennis.
Whether it be "ad hoc balancing," where the interest in prohibiting the conduct is
weighed against the interest of the person in pursuing such conduct (see Morris & Powe,
Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Open Housing, 44 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28-46
(1968); Kauper, Political Freedom, 58 MICH. L. REV. 619 (1960); Karst, Legislative
Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 75; Karst, The First Amendment
and Harry Kalven, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1965)), or "definitional balancing," where
the court defines such concepts as "speech," "abridge," and "freedom" in light of the
facts presented in each case and then weighs the respective interests and burdens involved
(see Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
912-16 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1433-45
(1962); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from 'Times' to 'Time': First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 935-67 (1968)),
courts have used some form of these techniques to decide whether limits on pure speech,
speech-plus and speech related conduct are justified. Balancing allows greater latitude
of decision at the expense of engendering uncertainty concerning the extent of first
amendment guarantees.
25. 522 F.2d at 247-48. The plaintiff-lawyers had maintained that balancing the
first amendment rights of attorneys against litigants' sixth amendment rights to fair trials
was not necessary since these two rights do not compete. Neither the first nor sixth
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Unfortunately, the court's conclusionary acceptance of the serious and
imminent threat standard offers little aid in either understanding the com-
plexities of a first amendment-sixth amendment conflict or in the search for
a consistent standard in measuring the scope of freedom of speech. While the
out-of-hand assertion that "only those comments which pose a serious and
imminent threat . . . can be conditionally proscribed" may reinforce the
Seventh Circuit's strict and aggressive posture -toward protecting first amend-
ment freedoms, it is simply not helpful in comprehending the theoretical
underpinnings which presumably support it and may as easily be negated by
a blanket conclusion to the contrary. It seems that some historical analysis
was in order here, particularly since the issue will undoubtedly be appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Even the inclusion of the serious threat standard was "not constitution-
ally sufficient by itself" because the gag rules were also attacked on vague-
ness grounds. The court proceeded to examine each rule to "determine
what may constitute a 'serious and imminent threat' of interference with the
fair administration of justice."'26
The analysis first considered the rules governing criminal proceedings.
In situations where criminal charges have not yet been lodged, but public
interest in the investigation is at a peak, the circuit perceived that a per se
limitation on public discussion concerning the government's prosecutorial
authority would be an affront to traditional concepts of free speech and
expression. 27 Government attorneys, however, are in a substantially differ-
ent position during this stage.
They have the ability to influence and ensure proper governmen-
tal procedure without resort to public opinion. Moreover, they
know what charges may be brought and are a prime source of
damaging statements. Admittedly, our formulation may place
prosecutors in a difficult position since they may be criticized for
a particular investigation but may not publicly respond. This is
a situation that competing interests necessitate. Ultimately the
prosecutor's response will come in the form of an indictment or
information or else the investigation will have ended and his
speech will be unrestricted. 28
amendment guarantees can effectively exist without the complimentary mandate and
result of the other. A fair trial assures that the freedom to speak will not be arbitrarily
taken away and, conversely, freedom of speech assures that a trial will be open and fair.
Chief Justice Burger recently commented in a Bicentennial Address to the Mormon
Tabernacle: "Through recognition of the dependence of one freedom on another and
through exercise of each, all can be preserved." Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 7, 1975, at
94, col. 2. From an ideal or abstract view the Seventh Circuit agreed that the two rights
can and should co-exist without disharmony. In everyday situations, however, the court
recognized that conflicts are inevitable. 522 F.2d at 248.
26. 522 F.2d at 250.
27. The court said: "Those in the best position to inform the public. . . should be
free to do so." Id. at 253.
28. Id.
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Accordingly, appropriate disciplinary rules could be fashioned and enforced
during a criminal investigation only in relation to attorneys associated with
the investigation on behalf of the government.
The court next considered speech limitation from the time of indictment
or arrest to commencement of trial or the entering of a guilty plea. There
are many reasons why an attorney may desire to comment during this time.
A lawyer may wish to publicly assert that a statute is unjust or unconstitu-
tional or that the prosecutor's office has abused its discretion in bringing
charges. Counsel may also seek to solicit defense funds. According to the
Seventh Circuit, however, none of these reasons were sufficient to overcome
the potential damage which comment by the defense or government attor-
neys may create. At this stage in the criminal judicial process, "formal con-
troversy that should be settled by the courts is in existence. The balance
swings more toward the necessity of prohibiting certain speech .... ,,29 State-
ments by either counsel concerning reputation, prior criminal records, results
of tests, confessions of guilt, plea bargaining offers, and opinions as to guilt,
evidence, or the merits of the case may be proscribed and may give rise to
a rebuttable presumption of posing a serious threat to the administration of
justice.
The time frame from jury selection to the end of trial was found to be
''a special one."
[This] period of time ... is relatively limited even in the case of a
lengthy trial. More important, it is the stage in which there is
likely to be the most intense news coverage and which therefore
creates the most need to ensure that inadmissible opinions or state-
ments do not encroach upon the laboratory conditions of the trial. 30
Attorney comments relating to the trial, the parties, or the issues in trial were
found capable of raising a presumption of serious and imminent harm.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court rejected the argument that in bench
trials and in jury trials where the jury is sequestered, the serious and
imminent danger test should not apply because the fact-finder could not be
influenced by any comment. And, although life-tenured federal judges may
be "men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate," 31 they are also
"human . . . [and may be] consciously or unconsciously influenced by
demonstration in or near their courtrooms both prior to and at the time of
the trial."132  On these grounds, the court decided that there should be no
distinction between bench trials and jury trials.
On the other hand, strict judicial isolation from exterior influences,
particularly comments by counsel of record, was found to be unnecessary
between the time of completion of trial and sentencing.
29. Id. at 254.
30. Id. at 255.
31. Id. at 256, citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
32. Id., citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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Unlike the prohibition on comment during a bench trial, there is
very little possibility that any factual matter that could not be
presented in court would be communicated to the judge by way
of extra-judicial comment of attorneys. This is because a judge
is entitled to consider almost any factor in exercising his sen-
tencing discretion. He may conduct an inquiry "largely unlimited
either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the
sources from which it may come."833
Finally, the court evaluated the applicability of gag rules to attorneys
engaged in civil lawsuits, noting that there are particular distinctions between
civil and criminal litigation, the most important of which is the greater
insularity against the possibility of interference with fairness in criminal
cases.
The point to be made is that the mere invocation of the phrase
"fair trial" does not as readily justify a restriction on speech
when we are referring to civil trials. [Other distinguishing factors
are that civil suits usually take longer to resolve than criminal
matters and often concern important social issues.]
. .. [C]ertain civil suits may be instigated for the very pur-
pose of gaining information for the public. Often actions are
brought on behalf of the public interest on a private attorney gen-
eral theory. Civil litigation in general often exposes the need for
governmental action or correction. Such revelations should not be
kept from the public. Yet it is normally only the attorney who will
have this knowledge or realize its significance. Sometimes a class of
poor or powerless citizens challenges, by way of a civil suit, actions
taken by our established private or semi-private institutions or gov-
ernmental entities. Often non-lawyers can adequately comment
publicly on behalf of these institutions or governmental entities. The
lawyer representing the class plaintiffs may be the only articulate
voice for that side of the case. Therefore, we should be extremely
skeptical about any rule that silences that voice.34
The inordinate time span of the rules prohibiting attorney comment on civil
matters and the public's interest in knowing about important social cases
prompted the circuit to hold that the gag rules could never be constitutionally
applied to civil suits.
Chicago Council of Lawyers demonstrates the conflicting policies which
surround the free speech-fair trial controversy and the problems inherent in
any attempt to limit attorneys' first amendment rights. It is unfortunate that
the court felt compelled to examine the rules for vagueness after they had
already held them unconstitutionally overbroad. No concrete controversy
was present. Unlike Oliver and Chase, no attorney had been disciplined
under the rules. While the court obviously sought to avoid the very involved
and time-consuming litigation of the same issues now tying up other courts, it
would have been better advised to await an actual situatiou in order to
33. Id. at 257 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 258.
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properly evaluate and balance the interests involved. As noted, however,
the Seventh Circuit often takes a pragmatic approach in the civil rights-civil
liberties area and thereby attempts to achieve a harmony between its desire
to vindicate and safeguard constitutional rights and its awareness of the
burdens of an ever-increasing caseload.
While Chicago Council of Lawyers questioned restrictions of "pure
speech," the court also resolved first amendment claims for protection of
expressive conduct. The cases dramatically illustrate that the circuit's
solicitous attitude toward first amendment freedom decreases markedly as
the challenged expression becomes more "conduct" and less "speech."
In Herzbrun v. Milwaukee County,35 the court rejected an overbreadth
attack on a county civil service regulation which authorized the suspension,
demotion, or discharge of any covered employee who is
guilty of acts or omissions unbecoming an incumbent of the par-
ticular office or position held, which render . . . suspension, de-
motion or discharge necessary or desirable for the economical or
efficient conduct of the business of the county or for the best in-
terest of the county goverument. 36
Plaintiff Herzbrun was a tenured civil service employee of the Milwau-
kee County Department of Public Welfare and the president of her local
union. When a dispute arose over the placement of bulletin boards an-
nouncing union activities, Herzbrun and other employees expressed their
displeasure by disrupting the Department's telephone system, causing a
major backup of incoming calls and destroying internal telecommunications.
After a hearing, Herzbrun was discharged from service and the others were
suspended for violations of the cited rule. Plaintiffs claimed that their
actions were protected by the first amendment's freedom of speech.
The district court reviewed the rule, found it vague and overbroad, and
ordered plaintiffs to be reinstated with back pay.3 7 The Seventh Circuit
reversed, concluding:
Although the action taken was a concerted response in a dispute
with management . . . we think the physical interference with
communication and the conduct of public business was too deliber-
ate, substantially disruptive, and prolonged to be classified as sym-
bolic speech and protected expression."8
35. 504 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1974).
36. Id. at 1192, citing Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Rules R. VII, § 4(1) (k).
37. Herzbrun v. Milwaukee County, 338 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See
also Zekas v. Baldwin, 334 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Wis. 1971), decided after the events and
before the decision in Herzbrun, which held the paragraph unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad.
38. 504 F.2d at 1193 n.2. It is interesting to note that in his concurring opinion
Judge Stevens did not consider the conduct to be expressive in nature and urged that
standing to raise any first amendment issue be denied in its entirety. Id. at 1197.
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First, the court asserted that, because of the nature and extent of their
actions, plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the rule on vagueness grounds.
On the basis of Broadrick v. Oklahoma,3 9 however, there was standing for
plaintiff's claim that the provision was an overbroad restraint of speech.
"Traditional rules of standing," the Broadrick court stated, now permit,
attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the per-
son making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specific-
ity.... . Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute
not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but be-
cause of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression. 40
But before this type of claim is sustainable, "the overbreadth of a statute
must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep."'41  To this, the Seventh Circuit added:
As we understand this test of substantial overbreadth, when eval-
uating statutes covering both speech and unprotected conduct once
a court determines that there is an area of possible impermissible
applications, the court is to compare that area with the "plainly
legitimate sweep" of the statute in order to determine that the
former is substantial. 42
The Herzbrun court applied these considerations in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Arnett v. Kennedy.43  Arnett concerned the constitution-
ality of a federal statutory and regulatory scheme which authorized the
removal or suspension of nonprobationary federal civil service employees
who "engage in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral or notoriously dis-
39. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
40. Id. at 612, citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
It remains a "matter of no little difficulty" to determine when a law may
properly be held void on its face and when "such summary action" is inappro-
priate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-
breadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that
its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected
behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from "pure speech" toward
conduct and that conduct---even if expressive--falls within the scope of other-
wise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some
unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best a prediction-
cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohib-
iting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly
within its power to proscribe.
Id. at 615 (citations omitted).
41. 413 U.S. at 615.
42. 504 F.2d at 1195. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 355-57 (7th
Cir. 1972); Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1970). But see Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Cf. United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524 (7th Cir.
1974), containing the appropriate basis for a challenge for overbreadth on fourth
amendment rather than first amendment grounds.
43. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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graceful or other conduct prejudicial to the Government" or who perform
acts "which might result in, or create the appearance of . . . [aiffecting
adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of the Government."
The Supreme Court flatly rejected a bid for facial overbreadth, reasoning
that the system was "not directed at speech as such but at employee
behavior, including speech, which is detrimental to the efficiency of [the
Government]." 44
Comparing the language of the Milwaukee County rule with that
upheld in Arnett, the court was unable to "conclude that the county rule is
significantly more broad in terms of arguable applicability to constitutionally
protected speech."'45 Accordingly, the regulation was not susceptible to a
first amendment assault.
A similar issue arose in Paulos v. Breier,46 a civil rights suit brought by a
Milwaukee police detective who was suspended from duty for sending a
letter to fifty-four subordinates urging them to support a particular candidate
for political office. The mailing allegedly violated a Milwaukee Police
Department regulation prohibiting police personnel from using "the influence
of their office for political reasons. '4 7
Plaintiff Paulos argued that, in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments, his right to freely express his opinions was abridged by this
overbroad and vague rule. The district court disagreed, declared the rule
constitutional, and dismissed the case. 48
Affirming, the Seventh Circuit was most careful in stating its holding:
"On [these] facts . ..we conclude that the interests of the municipality in
preserving a nonpartisan police force and the appearance thereof . . . out-
weighs the interests of plaintiff in conveying his endorsement to subordinate
officers."' 49 The overbreadth and vagueness challenges were rejected be-
cause Paulos lacked the requisite legal interest to raise these questions.
Employing the Broadrick test of "real and substantial overbreadth," the
court decided that the regulation "is constitutionally applicable to a myriad
of situations" and "has a substantially legitimate sweep" within which
44. Id. at 162.
45. 504 F.2d at 1194.
46. 507 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1974).
47. Id. at 1384, citing Milwaukee County Police Dept. Rules and Regulations R.
29, § 31.
48. Paulos v. Breier, 371 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
49. 507 F.2d at 1386, citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1974) and CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973). The court noted that "a
balance must be struck between the First Amendment interest of a state employee and
the interests of the state in promoting the efficiency of the public services that it
performs through its employees." Relying on the government interests detailed in Letter
Carriers, the court believed the county rule to be justified. Id. at 1385. See Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616-17 (1973).
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plaintiff's conduct fell.50  Concerned for "persons on the edge of the
regulation's applicability whose rights [may be] constitutionally infringed,"
the court suggested that "it will be for them to make the challenge in the
context of a concrete dispute, so that a court need not base its decision on
mere hypothetical infringements which this plaintiff asserts." 51
Likewise, Paulos' vagueness argument could not be considered as
presenting a viable case or controversy since "[a] reasonable man would
have had fair notice that as a police detective he was prohibited by the
regulation from sending a political endorsement to the patrolmen in his
voting district."'52
Another decision, Sheehan v. Scott,53 raised overbreadth and vagueness
questions concerning the words "habitually truant" as used in the compulsory
school attendance sections of the Illinois School Code and the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act. 54 Turning aside Sheehan's claim for failure to state a
substantial constitutional issue, the court held that his absence from school
for 11 of 19 days in a calendar month constituted "habitual truancy," how-
ever defined, and was not entitled to first amendment protection because
"plaintiff was [not] attempting to express anything of a protected nature
"55 Since Sheehan had no first amendment claim, he lacked standing
to challenge the statutory scheme on overbreadth concepts.
As for vagueness, the court, citing United States v. Harriss,56 perceived
the appropriate standard for application as follows:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.
The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally
50. 507 F.2d at 1386-87.
51. 507 F.2d at 1387. It is unfortunate that the Chicago Council of Lawyers
panel did not adopt this judicious attitude.
52. Id. See 413 U.S. at 578-79; 417 U.S. at 757; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612, 618 (1954). In refusing to hold the rule vague as related to Paulos, Judge
Cummings distinguished the Seventh Circuit's earlier and apparently contrary decision in
Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1121 (1975).
There a Milwaukee Police Department rule prohibiting "conduct unbecoming a member
and detrimental to the service" was held unconstitutionally vague. Bence had been
disciplined for sending a letter to the city's labor negotiator outlining and explaining a
proposed bargaining demand. The Seventh Circuit held the regulation vague both as
applied and on its face. The court relied in part upon the "as applied" holding to avoid
standing problems. 501 F.2d at 1193. Paulos and Bence were distinguished as involving
different regulations and different conduct. Also, Bence was the more compelling case,
because Paulos, unlike Bence, had ample notice that his conduct was proscribed by the
rule prohibiting the use of the office to influence political matters. 507 F.2d at 1388.
53. 520 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1975).
54. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 26-1 et seq. (1973); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-
3(b) (1973).
55. 520 F.2d at 828.
56. 347 U.S. 612, 617-18 (1954).
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responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand
to be proscribed.
On the other hand, if the general class of offenses to which the
statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not
be struck down as vague even though marginal cases could be put
where doubts might arise. And if this general class of offenses
can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction
of the statute, this Court is under a duty to give the statute that
construction.5 7
Upon examination, the court determined that plaintiff's claim of vagueness
was meritless since his conduct was so unmistakeably covered by the law.
These decisions manifest the court's reluctance to protect expression by
conduct as opposed to expression by speech alone. As a plaintiff's first
amendment activity moves toward the "hard-core" conduct end of the
speech-conduct continuum, the court of appeals limits overbreadth and
vagueness challenges to a consideration of the precise case or controversy
under examination. And this is so despite its explicit recognition that a
particular rule or statute may potentially or immediately interfere with the
first amendment rights of non-litigants, thereby "chilling" their freedom of
speech.58
Two additional first amendment cases-Chicago Area Military Project
v. City of Chicago9 and Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup
Co.60 -merit comment because both involve attempted limitations of free
speech in specific locales.
The Chicago Area Military Project (CAMP) publishes a "GI Move-
ment" newsletter which is distributed free to interested servicemen and
members of the public. Chicago's O'Hare Field, a center of national air
travel, is one of CAMP's primary distribution points. Enforcing an unwrit-
ten regulation against leafletting, Chicago police officers threatened CAMP
members with arrest if they persisted with their activity at the airport.
Alleging first amendment violations, CAMP sued for injunctive and mone-
tary relief.
The district court conducted a hearing at which city officials at-
57. 520 F.2d at 828 (citations omitted).
58. Civil rights advocates should take note of the increasing use of the "hard-core"
concept. In Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), invalidating for vagueness a
Massachusetts flag misuse statute, Justice Powell maintained that, if Goguen's behavior
had rendered him a "hard-core" violator, the statute might not be impermissibly vague,
whatever its implications for those engaged in different conduct. He said: "To be sure
there [will be] statutes that by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply without
question to certain activities, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain. The
hard-core violator concept makes some sense with regard to such statutes." Id. at 577-78.
As discussed in the text, this hard-core concept was a factor in all the speech-plus
decisions rendered by the Seventh Circuit this term.
59. 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975).
60. 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975).
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tempted in vain to recreate and explain the oral rule. The court found for
the plaintiffs and entered an order enjoining the city from interfering with
this protected expression and assembly in the public places of the airport.
The airplane arrival and departure areas were expressly excluded from the
effect of the order.
Defendants appealed and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Preliminarily,
the court recited:
The First Amendment to the Constitution proscribes federal ac-
tion which abridges an individual's right to freedom of speech,
press and assembly and it has long been settled that the Four-
teenth Amendment extends these First Amendment proscriptions
to state action. One of the primary reasons for the adoption of
the First Amendment was to ensure the right to distribute copies
of one's own publication in public places."'
Rejecting defendants' argument that O'Hare's terminal buildings are not
public places and only serve the public for the limited purpose of air travel,
the court observed:
There is no question but that the terminal buildings at O'Hare
Airport, city-owned and operated, are freely available to the gen-
eral public and that their wide-open public areas which perhaps
90,000 transients visit daily can accommodate seven persons peace-
fully distributing, in groups of twos and threes, free copies of
their publication to interested persons. Indeed, although airport
and airline officials testified that unrestricted leafletting and solici-
tation could conceivably interfere with important airport opera-
tions, the City does not contend that the activities of the plain-
tiffs do in fact obstruct airport traffic.62
In this context, then, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that
plaintiffs were entitled to equitable protection against the unconstitutional
activity of the defendants. Affirming the acceptability, however, of narrow
regulations drawn to protect substantial interests of the state, the court also
approved the exclusion of the "working" areas of O'Hare Field from the
injunction order.
A "company town" issue confronted the court in Illinois Migrant
Council. There the council (IMC) was denied access to consult with and
advise Campbell Soup Company farm workers residing in the company's
residential community at Prince Crossing, Illinois. Maintaining that Prince
61. 508 F.2d at 924 (citation omitted). See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939).
62. 508 F.2d at 925. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (city owned
common areas recognized as particularly appropriate places for exercise of right to
communicate ideas and information); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d
83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968) (publically owned bus terminal);
Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1973) (city airport).
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Crossing is a "company town" within the meaning of Marsh v. Alabama,6 3
plaintiffs IMC and its regional director brought suit against Campbell for
injunctive and monetary relief. Although the complaint stated that the
company maintained a residential community complete with basic services
for the residents, and that access to the town was by private road protected
by the state trespass laws, the district court found that plaintiff's failure to
allege that the company maintained ordinary municipal services constituted
an admission that it did not maintain such services.6 4 On this basis, the court
held that the community did not possess the requisite public characteristics
that would constitute state action, for purposes of federal jurisdiction.65
The Seventh Circuit reversed, chiding the district court for its myopic
view of plaintiffs' claim:
The district court read the plaintiffs' complaint as narrowly as
possible-and drew every inference adverse to the plaintiffs' claim.
The district court had a duty to construe all allegations of the
complaint in the light most favorable to -the plaintiffs, and this it
failed to do.66
The court reiterated the firmly established rule of pleading that a complaint
may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only when "'it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.' "67 Liberally construing the allegations of
plaintiffs' complaint, the court concluded that sufficient facts were asserted to
support the claim that Prince Crossing was a "company town" and that, if
Campbell Soup refused plaintiffs access to the community, it did so under
color of state law. In summary, where a private entity assumes and
exercises the attributes of a state-created municipality, it stands "in the shoes
of the state" and its actions must be deemed to constitute those of the state.
Thus, the court found Campbell's refusal to permit IMC to enter Prince
Crossing to be constitutionally infirm:
63. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). A "company town" is a community operated by a
private company which "possesses the characteristics of any other American town" and
which serves as a functional equivalent of a municipality for its residents. Id. at 502.
Such a designation warrants a finding of "state action" sufficient to bring actions of the
otherwise private entity within the proscriptions of the Civil Rights Act, 519 F.2d at
395. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968). Compare Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972);
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
64. 519 F.2d, at 394. The district court's decision was based on the plaintiff's
failure to allege that the company maintained police, sewage, postal and shopping
facilities as part of the "municipal" services provided.
65. Id. at 394-95.
66. Id., citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
67. Id. at 394, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6 (1957). See Gard-
ner v. Toilet Goods Assoc., 387 U.S. 167 (1967); Murray v. City of Milford, 380 F.2d
468 (2d Cir. 1967); RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 436 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1970).
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Municipal regulations affecting constitutional rights must be
drawn with "precision," and must be "tailored," to accomplish
their legitimate objectives. A city may not choose the most re-
strictive method of regulation if other, "less drastic means," are
available. Clearly, the defendant's [action] fails to comply with
these stringent requirements.68
CAMP and Illinois Migrant Council bring no new law to their respec-
tive areas, but merely reaffirm, in no uncertain terms, the Seventh Circuit's
strong prejudice against activity, sanctioned by state law, which infringes
upon protected rights. This term's abortion decisions are further testimony
to this attitude.
ABORTION
The continuing action and reaction arising from the Supreme Court's
landmark decisions in Roe v. Wade69 and Doe v. Bolton70 brought two
interesting abortion cases before the Seventh Circuit. The court has long
exhibited considerable sympathy for the constitutional protection of privacy
which gives support to the so-called "right to abort."
Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health7' represents
one of the most far-reaching circuit court decisions this year. The issue was
whether the Board of Health could promulgate and enforce a medical
regulatory system which dictated-without reference to the trimester of
pregnancy involved-the conditions, equipment, and procedures of abortion
facilities. The court thought not.
In May 1973, shortly after Roe and Doe were rendered, the Board of
Health adopted certain Regulations for Abortion Services in the City of
Chicago, requiring that abortions be performed by a licensed obstetrician or
surgeon in a hospital or clinic complying with the rules. Each medical
facility was subject to extensive record-keeping and reporting requirements
and had to maintain normal surgical equipment as well as an affiliation
agreement with a licensed Chicago hospital, for purposes of lab tests and
emergencies. Before aborting, each patient was obliged to undergo a
68. 519 F.2d at 396. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159; Sherain, Beyond Roe and Doe:
The Rights of the Father, 50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 483 (1975); Rubin, The Abortion
Cases: A Study in Law and Social Change, 5 N.C. CENTRAL L.J. 215 (1974); Bryn,
Wade and Bolten: Fundamental Legal Errors and Dangerous Implications, 19 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 243 (1973); Comments, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1191 (1974); 61 GEO. L.J. 1559
(1973); 39 ALBANY L. REv. 856 (1975); 9 SUFFOLK U.L. RV. 841 (1975).
70. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See McKeran, Compelling Hospitals to Provide Abor-
tions, 20 CATHOLIC LAWYER 317 (1974).
71. 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
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complete physical examination and to delay the operation until twenty-four
hours after the check-up. At the abortion itself, the rules required that the
physician be attended by a registered nurse with obstetric or gynocological
experience of at least one year and that a social service unit be available to
the patient.
The Medical Center and its director, Dr. T. R. M. Howard, offered
abortion services to the public at the time the Board of Health regulatory
scheme became effective. Although no action was taken against them, these
parties filed suit claiming that the Board's regulations were undue restrictions
on the patient's right to privacy and on plaintiffs' "rights to treat medical
matters relating to abortion." Arguing that the rules had no legitimate
relation to any recognizable governmental interest in maternal health, the
clinic and Howard contended that they were overbroad and invalid.
The district court disagreed. Rejecting the privacy challenge on stand-
ing grounds, the court ruled that reasonable state efforts to impose safety re-
quirements on those seeking and performing abortions were not prohibited
by the Constitution, Roe, or Doe.72 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed,
limiting its review to a consideration of the standing of plaintiffs and the pri-
vacy rights of the patient.
Relying on Griswold v. Connecticut,78 Eisenstadt v. Baird,74 and Doe,
the court granted privacy standing to the Medical Center and Howard.
[I]n our view the fact that the challenged regulations are aimed and
operate directly on the plaintiffs, and are of a continuing nature,
with potentially very real criminal consequences is sufficient to
allow plaintiffs to assert the rights of their patients ...
• ..This is not, therefore, a case where one party seeks to raise
the rights of another with whom he has only marginal involvement.
Rather as the Court recognized in Griswold the rights being asserted
were "likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights
are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of con-
fidential relation to [the one whose rights are raised] . . .-.
Quoting from Barrows v. Jackson,76 the court concluded:
72. 367 F. Supp. 594 (1973). See Stephens v. Dennis, 293 F. Supp. 589 (N.D.
Ala. 1968).
73. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where a physician was granted standing to assert the
constitutional rights of married persons in challenging a Connecticut statute forbidding
the use of contraceptives.
74. 405 U.S. 438 (1972), where a physician was allowed to champion the rights of
unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives.
75. 505 F.2d at 1147. See Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1387-88 (N.D. Ill.
1971), vacated on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446
F.2d 833, 839-40 (6th Cir. 1971).
76. 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953), where, in an action for damages for breach of a
racially restrictive covenant, the Supreme Court allowed a seller of land to defend on the
grounds that the covenant violated the equal protection rights of prospective non-
Caucasian purchasers.
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Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the rea-
sons which underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's
rights, which is only a rule of practice, are outweighed by the
need to protect the fundamental rights which would be denied by
permitting the damages action to be maintained. 77
With standing established, the constitutionality of the Chicago regula-
tions was measured in light of Roe and Doe. The Roe-Doe line of cases
posited that, in making and executing the decision to abort, a pregnant
woman's right of privacy must be balanced with the state's interest in her
welfare. In effecting this balance, the Supreme Court wrote that, during the
second and third trimesters of pregnancy, "a State may regulate the abortion
procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preserva-
tion and protection of maternal health. s78  However, prior to a magical
"compelling point" which occurs on the first day of the second trimester,
the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to
determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that
decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abor-
tion free of interference by the State.79
By virtue of these principles, the Seventh Circuit in Friendship Medical
Center held that the Board of Health regulations must fall because they
unduly interfered with the woman's abortion decision.
The decision whether or not to abort a pregnancy cannot be made
in a vacuum without regard to who will perform the operation,
where and under what conditions it will be performed, and what
procedure will be followed. All these are involved in any abor-
tion decision and it is precisely these elements of the decision that
,the regulations challenged here seek to control.80
In short, the regulations by their very nature restricted the abortion decision
and affected whether and in what manner an abortion would take place.
An additional reason for invalidating the Board's rules lay in the fact
that, contrary to the equal protection requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Chicago Board of Health Rules on Abortion Services comprehen-
sively regulated physicians who performed abortions, while at the same time
leaving other medical procedures, often much more complex and dangerous
77. 505 F.2d at 1148. See Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. 111. 1971), where
a physician was allowed to assert the privacy rights of his patient in an action seeking to
declare the Illinois anti-abortion statute unconstitutional. See also Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Crossen v.
Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971).
78. 410 U.S. at 163.
79. Id.
80. 505 F.2d at 1151. According to the Seventh Circuit, Roe and Doe implied that
"even after the decision to abort . . . is made, that decision must be able to be
'effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.' Id., citing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. at 163.
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in terms of the patient's health, to the good judgment of the physician. Thus,
because the Board treated abortion procedures differently than similar medi-
cal operations and because this treatment adversely affected fundamental
rights without a compelling justification, "the challenged regulations [could]
not be allowed to remain in effect." 81
The court's opinion is a concise explanation of Roe, Doe and the
permissible scope of direct and indirect state regulation of abortion. The
essence of Friendship Medical Center is that, while purporting to promote
maternal well-being, the Chicago Board of Health's rules unreasonably and
unjustifiably infringed upon the individual's right to privacy, at least in the
first trimester, to decide to abort a pregnancy.82
Doe v. Mundy, 3 the Seventh Circuit's other abortion decision this
term, concerned the validity of a rule of the Medical Staff at Milwaukee
County General Hospital permitting the use of hospital facilities for an
abortion only when a pregnancy is complicated by medical conditions of such
nature and advanced to such degree that continuation of pregnancy threatens
the life of the mother. The district court found the application of this
regulation to be an unconstitutional deprivation of pregnant women's rights
and preliminarily enjoined its operation.8 4
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although much of Mundy
concerns the technical propriety of the district court's injunctive grant
and is inapposite to the instant discussion, its importance lies in its
unflinching resolution that a publicly owned and operated hospital may not
close its doors to abortion, either by rule or by practice.
Fortunately or unfortunately, abortion on demand is here to stay, at
least until the human fetus is recognized as being entitled to the constitution-
al freedoms accorded to "persons" by the fourteenth amendment. In its
81. 505 F.2d at 1153. See Doe v. Hale Hospital, 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974).
But see Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term-Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in
The Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 30 (1973).
82. 505 F.2d at 1153-54. Since the Board of Health Regulations interfered with the
means necessary to effectuate an abortion, in that they unduly restricted the abortion
decision, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that such regulations may only be justified by a
compelling state interest. This conclusion was drawn despite the fact that both Roe and
Doe permit post-first trimester abortion procedures to whatever extent reasonably related
to the preservation and promotion of maternal health. 410 U.S. at 163, 189.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Fairchild argued that regulations of the safety of all
medical procedures do not have to meet the compelling state interest test. Imposition of
generally applicable safety regulations, even though incidentally including first trimester
abortions, would "seem to be a valid exercise of the State's interest in protecting health
and need only satisfy the traditional tests of judicial scrutiny [reasonable relationship]."
505 F.2d at 1155. But like the majority, he believed that the present regulations, at least
as applied to the first trimester of pregnancy, imposed a "burdensome, extra layer of
requirements upon a surgical process deemed indistinguishable from similar medical
procedures." Id.
83. 514 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975).
84. 378 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
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interpretation of Roe and Doe, the Seventh Circuit has been an aggressive
advocate of the right to abort. At least in this circuit, states bear a heavy,
almost impossible, burden to justify abortion procedure regulations. During
the first trimester, only limited and compelling responses will be permitted. 85
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT LITIGATION
Constitutional claims arising under the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment invariably entail intricate evaluations
of individual and social issues. Decisions in these areas, it seems, are often
based upon subjective predilection rather than objective legality. This
criticism is understandable. Because due process is an elusive concept with
undefinable boundaries, the particular process that is due depends upon a
variety of social factors. And, since the equal protection clause only bars
a state from creating unreasonable and arbitrary classifications, its scope is
often a matter of a court's personal opinion.
In its fourteenth amendment litigation this term, the Seventh Circuit
was called upon to resolve questions ranging from the refusal to allow
women to participate in high school athletics to the standard of proof
required in a commitment hearing under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act. Never simple, these cases demonstrate the broad protection
offered by the federal constitution. Due to the extensiveness of this area of
protection, categorization of opinions is difficult and often impossible. In-
deed, the cryptic and abstract words that give rise to these protections make
generalizations about trends necessarily fraught with exceptions.
Due Process
In the area of due process, one thing is clear: "[A]t a minimum [due
process] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudica-
85. In Friendship Medical Center, the court noted that the fundamental rights
established in Roe and Doe necessarily limit the effect any general health regulation
would have on first trimester abortions. "[l]n all probability nothing broader than gen-
eral requirements as to the maintaining of sanitary facilities and general requirements as
to meeting minimal building code standards would be permissible." 505 F.2d at 1154.
Cautioning against regulations which might be overly restrictive even after the first
trimester, the court said:
Even if the challenged regulations here were interpreted as applying only to
the period after the first trimester, there is no basis in the record upon which
this court could make a determination as to which of these regulations were
reasonably related to a valid state interest.
While under a rational relationship type test a municipal ordinance pursu-
ant to its police powers will be given great deference, it must be remembered
that at the end of the first trimester a woman does not lose completely her
right of privacy. . . . [A]ny regulation dealing with maternal health after
[that point] must not only be reasonably related to a valid health purpose,
but must have appropriate regard to the still existing right of privacy of the
mother. Exactly where this balance is to be struck will have to be decided
on a case by case basis.
Id. at 1154 n.19.
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tion be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case." 8 Several Seventh Circuit opinions of the last term dem-
onstrate the meaning of this rule.
Muscare v. Quinn7 concerned the need for a due process hearing
prior to deprivation of vested employment rights. Lieutenant Frank Mus-
care was a twenty-year veteran of the Chicago Fire Department who was
suspended from duty for 29 days on the ground that his "goatee" violated
the Department's personal appearance regulation.8" The Department con-
tended, without verification, that facial hair, such as plaintiff's goatee,
prevented firefighters from obtaining a proper seal on the mask portion of a
self-contained breathing apparatus. After several warnings and orders to
shave, the Fire Department suspended Muscare without notice or a hearing.
Muscare brought suit seeking injunctive relief, claiming that the regulation
and his suspension violated his constitutional right to determine his personal
appearance. The district court held a hearing on the matter and denied
relief.
The Seventh Circuit reversed. In a per curiam opinion, the court found
it unnecessary to resolve the freedom of appearance controversy. Instead, it
ruled that the suspension was accomplished without proper regard for the
constitutionally mandated requirement of procedural due process.8 9 Reject-
86. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
87. 520 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1975).
88. Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Depart-
ment provides:
Section 51.133, Proper Personal Appearance
All members of the Chicago Fire Department shall present a clean and
proper appearance in personal care and attire at all times. The face shall
be clean-shaven, except that a non-eccentric mustache is permissible.
Mustaches shall not extend beyond a line perpendicular to the corner of
the mouth and the full upper lip must be readily visible. Sideburns shall
be trimmed short and shall be no lower than a line from the middle of
the ear.
Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the hair outline shall
follow the contour of the ear and slope to the back of the neck. It will
be gradually tapered overall in order to present a neat appearance.
Id. at 1213 n.1.
89. Muscare argued that Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970), compels recognition of the "right to wear one's hair at any
length or in any desired manner [as] an ingredient of personal freedom protected by the
. . . Constitution." 520 F.2d at 1213. The court in Muscare surveyed a number of
the "hair" decisions in recent years.
Some courts have upheld hair regulations solely on the basis of "paramilitary"
discipline or the need to present a well-groomed image to the public; other
courts, however, have rejected this view. More recently, fire departments
across the country have begun to justify hair regulations on the basis of safety
considerations, in particular, the efficient use of gas masks. Though funda-
mentally a fact question, most courts have accepted this theory. Only a few
courts have found no basis for this justification. In passing, we note but with-
out holding that the challenged hair regulation, § 51.133, does not appear to
be co-extensive with the need for safe and efficient use of gas masks and, if
that is the sole justification, might well be more narrowly drawn.
Id. at 1213 n.2 (citations omitted).
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ing the Department's contention that plaintiff's actual knowledge of the
charges against him and his statutory right to a post suspension hearing"
satisfied due process, the court held:
Public employees facing temporary suspension for less than 30
days have interests qualifying for protection under the Due Process
Clause, and due process requires at the minimum that they be
granted a hearing prior to suspension where they may be fully
informed of the reasons for the proposed suspension and where
they may challenge their sufficiency. 91
This ruling was in apparent conflict with a recent Illinois Supreme
Court decision which upheld the constitutionality of the summary suspension
procedures used by the Chicago Police Department, concluding that, for
suspensions of more than five and less than thirty days, due process was met
by post-suspension review.92 However, in the even more recent United
States Supreme Court decision in Goss v. Lopez,93 a school case where
several students attacked summary suspension and expulsion procedures, the
high court opined that "a state employee who under state law, or rules
promulgated by state officials, has a legitimate claim of entitlement to
continued employment absent sufficient cause for discharge may demand the
procedural protections of due process.19 4  And, in Arnett v. Kennedy,95
although rejecting a due process attack, six Justices agreed that the minimal
requirements of constitutional due process96 applied to the discharge of a
federal civil servant.
Comparing these decisions to Muscare's situation, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that at least the same minimal standards should be applied to the
suspension of a public employee: "Not only are alleged transgressions justify-
ing suspension often more serious than school discipline problems, but the
corresponding penalties are potentially more damaging, for reputations,
careers, and substantial amounts of lost pay are at stake."9 7 Moreover, the
90. Section 10-1-18 of the Illinois Municipal Code provides:
Except as hereinafter provided in this section, no officer or employee in the
classified civil service of any municipality who is appointed under the rules and
after examination, may be removed or discharged, or suspended for a period
of more than 30 days, except for cause upon written charges and after an op-
portunity to be heard in his own defense. * * * Nothing in this Division 1
limits the power of any officer to suspend a subordinate for a reasonable
period, not exceeding 30 days except that any employee or officer suspended
for more than 5 days or suspended within 6 months after a previous suspension
shall be entitled, upon request, to a hearing before the civil service commission
concerning the propriety of such suspension.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-1-18 (1973).
91. 520 F.2d at 1215.
92. Kropel v. Conlisk, 60 Ill. 2d 17, 322 N.E.2d 793 (1975).
93. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
94. Id. at 573.
95. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
96. Id. (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring; White, Douglas, Marshall & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting).
97. 520 F.2d at 1215. During the 29-day suspension, Lt. Muscare lost some $1400
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requirement of pre-suspension review would neither unnecessarily burden
the administration of public services nor prevent administrators from dealing
with emergency disciplinary problems as they arise. 98 On the merits of
Muscare, the court could "perceive no justification for avoiding the require-
ment of a pre-suspension hearing."99
Another firm assertion of due process principles is found in Vargas v.
Trainor,100 where the Seventh Circuit considered the adequacy of the notice
required in reducing a welfare recipient's Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) benefits. SSI was enacted by the 1974 amendments to Title XVI of
the Social Security Act and replaced in part the program of Aid to the Aged,
Blind and Disabled (AABD) established by the same act. 101 SSI provides
for a uniform federal minimum assistance grant, currently worth $146 per
month, funded by the Social Security Administration, coupled with a manda-
tory supplement funded by the states. The state supplement was designed to
insure individual recipients of their former AAID levels of welfare relief.
Where a change with respect to some special need or circumstance occurs,
the mandatory state supplement could be enlarged or reduced to reflect the
change.102
In late September 1974, the Illinois Department of Public Aid, which
administers and pays the supplement to Illinois residents, mailed a written
notice to some 3,780 aged, blind, or disabled recipients-approximately ten
percent of all recipients-advising them that their individual assistance for
October would be reduced to a subsequently specified amount. The notice
stated the reduction was due to "changes in your needs or living arrange-
ments which occurred between January 1, 1974 and the current month but
which were not entered on your record so as to reflect your check." No
additional explanation or statement of reasons was given. The notice
informed the recipient that the reduction would not be made if wrong and
that if there were questions or complaints, the assigned case worker should
be consulted.
in pay, and as noted by a concurring judge in Ricucci v. United States, 425 F.2d 1252,
1257 (Ct. Cl. 1970), "'[flew [government employees] earn more than enough to pay
their living expenses from month to month, and when their salaries are cut off they may
be in the same destitute circumstances as a welfare recipient whose aid has been discon-
tinued.'" 520 F.2d at 1215 n.3.
98. The Seventh Circuit conceded that, in an emergency, an official body can first
take summary action and later provide a hearing "'where harm to the public is threat-
ened, and the private interest infringed is deemed to be of less importance.'" 520 F.2d
at 1216, quoting R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962). Accord Bickham v. Cannon, 516 F.2d 885 (7th Cir.
1975); LaBatt v. Twomey, 513 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975).
99. 520 F.2d at 1216.
100. 508 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1008 (1975).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1970).
102. Renegotiation Amendments of 1973 § 212(a) (3) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (Supp.
MI, 1973).
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Elvira Vargas was one of the AABD recipients who received a notice of
reduction. She promptly filed a class action attacking the notice as inade-
quate and untimely and asserting that every member of the class was entitled
to a pre-reducing or pre-termination hearing. The district court found the
notice and opportunity to be adequate. Judgment was entered for the
Department of Public Aid. Plaintiff appealed and the Seventh Circuit
granted temporary relief enjoining defendants from reducing grants based on
the notice.
In late November, the Department issued a new "Notice of Reduction
(AABD)" to members of plaintiff's class, this one advising that grants for
December would be less than those for November. In all respects the
November notice was identical to the September notice, except that, unlike
the September notice which showed only the total amount of the new
monthly grant, the November notice contained a breakdown showing the
amount allowed for each item such as clothing, household supplies, rent and
other items. 10 3 The new notice also failed to state the reasons for the grant
reduction.1 04  After receiving her November notice, Vargas filed an amend-
ed complaint, which was also denied and appealed.
Consolidating the two cases, the court reversed, holding that, when
adjusting vested welfare benefits, the state must observe due process require-
ments and that the notices in question were infirm because they failed to
sufficiently apprise recipients of the reasons for the reductions in their
grants.105
The Seventh Circuit examined Vargas in light of Goldberg v. Kelly,'0 6
where the Supreme Court held that a state could not terminate welfare
benefits without first providing recipients with a hearing.
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportu-
nity to be heard." The hearing must be "at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner." In the present context these prin-
ciples require that a recipient have timely and adequate notice
detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective
opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and
by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.' 0 7
Conceding that this statement was dicta, the court nevertheless felt com-
pelled to follow its reasoning. Relying on extensive authority'0 and citing
103. The Seventh Circuit opined: "Unless the recipients [knew] the components of
their former grants, and apparently most [did] not, they [would] not even know what
changes were made in the components." 508 F.2d at 488 n.l.
104. Id.
105. 508 F.2d at 490.
106. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
107. Id. at 267-68 (citations omitted).
108. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970)
(state agency's procedure for terminating leases of public housing tenants violated due
process in not advising tenants of the reasons for termination); Pregent v. New
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its own prior decision in Brooks v. Center Township,10 9 the court concluded
that a notice of proposed action could be adequate only if it explained the
action taken.
It found that, even if the case authorities did not require "notice with
reasons," the Vargas notice would still fail to meet the requirements of due
process because it
is addressed to persons who are aged, blind, or disabled, many of
whom, defendant could have anticipated, would be unable or dis-
inclined, because of physical handicaps and, in the case of the
aged, mental handicaps as well, to take the necessary affirmative
action. Within what was left of the ten days after they received
the notice, they were required either to manage to meet with their
caseworkers and learn the reasons for the proposed action and
then decide whether to appeal, or to appeal without knowing
whether an appeal might have merit. If they failed to do either,
their benefits were reduced or terminated without their being ad-
vised why. Under such a procedure only the aggressive receive
their due process right to be advised of the reasons for the pro-
posed action. The meek and submissive remain in the dark and
suffer their benefits to be reduced or terminated without knowing
why the Department is taking that action.110
If most of the 3,780 recipients of the reduction notices had, as
suggested, sought out their caseworker, the work of the Department would
have been severely disrupted and the burden would have been intolerable. By
comparison, written notice with explicit reasons would have caused a "mild
inconvenience." Even the court noted that the deliberate choice of the sum-
mary form of notice indicated that the Department did not expect many
people to seek explanations or to be informed of the reasons for the reduc-
tion.
The bureaucratic mistakes made with Robert Collier 1 ' underscore the
Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 361 F. Supp. 782 (D.N.H. 1973), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974) (denial of due process by state
authorities in failing to inform public assistance recipient of reasons for reducing benefits
prior to taking action); Sims v. Juras, 313 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Ore. 1969); see Caldwell v.
Laupheimer, 311 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Pa. 1969); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp.
1122 (D. Mass. 1970), a! 'd, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971) (tenant in publically
subsidized housing has right to pre-termination notice stating reasons for proposed
action); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961)
(student faced with expulsion entitled to notice containing a statement of reasons).
109. 485 F.2d 383, 385 (7th Cir. 1973), holding Indiana poor relief statute invalid
for want of due process in failing to provide for notice of reasons for termination.
110. 508 F.2d at 489-90.
111. One member of the class, Robert Collier, appealed after receiving the first
notice, and, after a hearing, the Department restored his grant to the September
level. One week after receiving notice of that action, however, he received his
copy of the November notice and its enclosed card, which informed him that
his grant had again been reduced to the October level specified in the previous
notice. Defendant stated in oral argument that apparently a mistake was made
with respect to Collier.
Id. at 488.
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need for procedural due process in the reduction of welfare benefits. The
court posited that, without adequate notice containing reasons for proposed
action, welfare recipients could very well allow these inevitable errors to go
uncorrected and thereby be deprived of the "means to obtain the necessities
of life." Aware that the state has a legitimate interest in making proper
welfare payments only to those who are eligible and equally aware that the
state has a right to make adjustments when warranted, the Seventh Circuit
held that the state must observe the requirements of due process in making
these decisions.
From Muscare and Vargas it is evident that due process does not
prevent the state in all instances from depriving individuals of a vested right.
Due process protection merely requires that the government may do so only
by a process that is "due." In Muscare and Vargas, the Seventh Circuit
faced issues where notice and a hearing were required. In United States ex
rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin,1 12 the court considered the quantum of proof
necessary in a particular type of due process proceeding.
In 1969, Frank Stachulak was confined, pursuant to the Illinois Sexual-
ly Dangerous Persons Act,1 1 3 at the Psychiatric Division of the Menard
Illinois State Penitentiary. Four years later, he brought a habeas corpus and
civil rights action challenging the lawfulness of his incarceration. The
district court granted relief on the grounds that the burden of proof-
preponderance of the evidence--employed at the commitment hearing vio-
lated plaintiff's due process right. The court ruled that a person could not be
committed under the Act unless proved sexually dangerous beyond a
reasonable dolibt. 11 4 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act allows the state to seek an
involuntary and indeterminate institutional commitment in lieu of a criminal
prosecution if a person is charged with a criminal offense and is believed to
be sexually dangerous."l 5  While the Act is silent as to the burden of proof
that the state must meet to establish "sexual dangerousness," proceedings
under the Act are designated as "civil in nature."" 6  At Stachulak's state
trial, the judge instructed the jury that they could find the defendant to be a
sexually dangerous person if the state had proved its case by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. This, the district and appellate court found, was error.
First, the Seventh Circuit stated that an indeterminate commitment
under the Act is a deprivation of liberty and a "grievous loss""11 7 mandating
that general principles of due process govern proceedings under the Act.
112. 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975).
113. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-1.01 etseq. (1973).
114. United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 369 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-3 (1973).
116. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-3.1 (1973).
117. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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Because these proceedings so closely resemble criminal prosecutions, Illinois
courts have accorded to individuals charged with sexual dangerousness some
of the safeguards applicable in criminal trials," s including the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, 119 the right against self incrimina-
tion' 20 and the right to a speedy trial, 1 2 1 as well as the statutory rights to a
hearing, jury trial and counsel.122
After reviewing and distinguishing precedents,' 23 the court of appeals
decided that the standard of proof question was governed by In re
Winship,' 24 a case dealing with adjudicatory juvenile delinquency hearings
and holding that the reasonable doubt standard was an "essential of due
process and fair treatment.' ' . 25 Asserting that the risk of loss of liberty and
the certainty of stigmatization resulting from an alleged violation of the
criminal law were integral factors in Winship, the court analogized by noting
that, in Stachulak's situation,
the loss of liberty is as great, if not greater, than the loss in Win-
ship. The violator of the criminal law-be he an adult or juve-
nile-is imprisoned, if at all, in almost all cases for a definite term.
The person found to be sexually dangerous, in stark contrast, is
committed for an indeterminate period and is unable to attain his
freedom until he can prove that he is no longer sexually dangerous.
Likewise with respect to stigma an involuntary commitment for
sexual dangerousness presents an a fortiori case: Unlike the delin-
quency proceedings in Winship, these actions are not confidential,
and an adjudication of sexual dangerousness is certainly more
damning than a finding of juvenile delinquency. 126
Illinois correctional officials sought to mitigate the gravity of plaintiff's
loss by asserting that the purpose of the commitment is to treat and cure the
dangerous sexual deviant. The court found this claim archaic.
118. See People v. Studdard, 51 Ill. 2d 190, 195-97, 281 N.E.2d 678, 681 (1972).
119. People v. Nastasio, 19 Ill. 2d 524, 529-30, 168 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1960).
120. People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d 301, 307, 201 N.E.2d 455, 459 (1964).
121. People v. Beshears, 65 Ill. App. 2d 446, 459, 213 N.E.2d 55, 62 (1965).
122. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-5 (1973).
123. Sprecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1957), discussing the fundamental protec-
tions required in proceedings under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, but not addressing
the question of burden of proof.
124. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
125. Id. at 359.
126. 520 F.2d at 935-36 n.4. The court also said:
The instant case illustrates the potential disparity in the magnitude of the
loss. Stachulak was originally charged with Indecent Solicitation of a Child
in violation of Ill. Ann. Stat. That offense carried a maximum penalty of a
$500 fine and less than one year imprisonment in a penal institution other than
a penitentiary. Instead of prosecuting him on that charge, the state brought
a proceeding, which culminated in an indeterminate commitment, under the
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. For the last five years, Stachulak has been
confined at the Psychiatric Division of the Illinois State Penitentiary at
Menard, a maximum-security penal institution.
Id. at 936 n.4 (citations omitted).
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All too often ,the "promise of treatment has served only to bring an
illusion of benevolence to what is essentially a warehousing opera-
tion for social misfits." It is well settled that realities rather than
benign motives or noncriminal labels determine the relevance of
constitutional policies. 127
Given the uncertainty inherent in the present state of psychiatric
diagnosis and prediction, the reasonable doubt standard presents many
difficulties. However, proof of mental state is a commonplace in the law.
Justifying its holding that the reasonable doubt standard is an essential
ingredient of sexually dangerousness proceedings, the Seventh Circuit said:
Burdens of proof serve to allocate the risk of an erroneous
decision between the parties in a lawsuit, and the reasonable-
doubt standard reflects society's judgment "that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." We
recognize that society has a substantial interest in the protection of
its members from dangerous deviant sexual behavior. But when
the stakes are so great for the individual facing commitment, proof
of sexual dangerousness must be sufficient to produce the highest
recognized degree of certitude.
Accordingly, we hold that due process requires that the
reasonable-doubt standard be applied in proceedings under the
Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.128
In the three cases just discussed, the court regarded the nature of the
plaintiffs' respective rights to be of sufficient importance to require due
process safeguards. However, in two other decisions last term, the court
concluded that neither the nature of the right nor the possibility of its
arbitrary deprivation was strong enough to activate the procedural protec-
tions of due process. In Field v. Boyle,' 29 the court refused due process
coverage to a state court magistrate removed from office by those who
appointed him. In Whitfield v. Illinois Board of Law Examiners,'"0 it held
that neither a full blown adversary hearing nor the right to compare one's
127. Id. at 936 (citations omitted). To reinforce its position, the court also opined:
Commitment of the mentally ill has been conventionally justified on two
bases: the state's parens patriae authority to protect and care for the mentally
ill and the state's police power to protect members of society against threat to
their persons and property. While the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act speci-
fies that the commitment is for treatment, the Act's concern with dangerous-
ness makes it clear that it rests on both these justifications. Nevertheless, since
the Act is an alternative to a criminal prosecution, it is also in a very real sense
a penal measure. Although in our view this factor has no bearing on the na-
ture of the individual's potential deprivation of liberty, it fortifies our conclu-
sion that due process requires proof of sexual dangerousness beyond a reason-
able doubt.
Id. at 936 n.5 (citations omitted). See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
128. 520 F.2d at 936 (citations omitted). See People v. Pembrock, 23 Ill. App. 3d
991, 320 N.E.2d 470 (1974), leave to appeal granted, 58 Il1. 2d 595 (1975), where an
Illinois appellate court, relying on the district court decision in Stachulak, also held that
the reasonable doubt standard was required in proceedings under the Act.
129. 503 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1974).
130. 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974).
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failing exam with others' passing exams was constitutionally required when
failing an applicant for the State Bar.
In Field, an ex-state magistrate brought a civil rights action seeking to
enjoin the judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County from removing him
from office. Under the Illinois Constitution of 1870, the judges of each
circuit court were authorized to appoint magistrates "at their pleasure."' 131
Local rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County provided that "the Circuit
Judges . . . shall appoint magistrates to serve at their pleasure . . . for a
term of one year commencing the first day of January each year and may be
reappointed for like terms during good behavior.' 1 32 The Illinois Constitu-
tion of 1970 made no provision for the office of magistrate. On July 1,
1971, the effective date of the new constitution, persons serving as magis-
trates were, with the exception of Field, elevated to the position of Associate
Judge for a four-year term. At a June 1971 meeting of the Cook County
Circuit Court judges, a majority of the judges casting ballots followed the
recommendation of a judicial committee assigned to evaluate the magistrates
and voted to remove Field from his position. Field alleged that this action
violated his rights under the fourteenth amendment, contending that the
judges failed to grant him notice, a "fair hearing," a statement of reasons
why he should not be retained, an adequate opportunity to respond to
"attacks on his reputation," and an opportunity to confront his detractors.
The district court held that the termination was a deprivation of a
property interest, requiring a due process hearing. However, the district
court ruled that Field had waived his right to a hearing because at a May 6,
1971 meeting of the magistrate evaluation committee, Field had not taken
action after being told that he had received a zero in every category in which
his qualifications for associate judge were evaluated. Summary judgment
was granted for defendant judges. 133
The Seventh Circuit accepted this determination and affirmed the
district court's action on the strength of two Supreme Court decisions. In
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 3 4 and Perry v. Sindermann, 35
the Court discussed the procedural rights of terminated public employees
who do not have a statutory right to continued employment and concluded
that the fourteenth amendment does not require notice and a hearing prior to
the non-renewal of a contract of a non-tenured teacher unless the teacher
shows that non-renewal deprived him either of a "liberty right" or "property
interest" in continued employment, as determined by reference to state
law.- 3 0 In Field, the Seventh Circuit found this reasoning dispositive.
131. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 12 (1870).
132. Cm. CT. COOK CourTY (LoCAL) R. 0.8.
133. 503 F.2d at 775-76.
134. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
135. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
136. 408 U.S. at 579; 408 U.S. at 599.
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First, the court held that former magistrate Field had no reasonable
expectancy of employment-"property interest"-which could not be divest-
ed without a due process hearing. Under the 1870 Constitution, magistrates
were appointed to one-year terms "at the pleasure" of the circuit judges. The
court reasoned that, by its "implicit terms," once the pleasure ceased to exist,
so would the appointment. "Here the pleasure ceased to exist as of June 30,
1971.''1 7 Even assuming that the annual appointment limits removal
during the term of the year, the court held that there simply was no power to
appoint for a year's -term after the 1970 Constitution became effective.
Referring to its own decision in Adams v. Walker,'8 8 -the court said:
We find no law or decision that mandates the conclusion that
Field had a property interest in a six-month term or that the Su-
preme Court of Illinois and the judges of the Circuit Court of Cook
County acting at its directive lacked the power to screen and dismiss
magistrates prior to July 1, 1971. Neither the old constitution nor
the local rule provided that magistrates could be terminated only for
specified reasons after a due process hearing. Magistrates served
"at [the] pleasure" of the judges. 18 9
Refusing to hold that the former magistrate had a property right in
continued employment, the court assumed, arguendo, that his "liberty inter-
est was sufficiently implicated so as to activate the due process clause.' 40
This assumption was based on the nature of the charges upon which Field's
dismissal was predicated, including the low appraisal of his integrity and
competence by the magistrate evaluation committee and the possible adverse
effect that it might have on his reputation and ability to seek other
employment. Turning to Roth, the Field court posited that a due process
hearing is constitutionally mandated to protect against deprivations of liberty
where the dismissal of a public employee is based on charges that might
seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. As Roth
explains, however, "'the purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the
person an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his
name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him
future employment for other reasons.' ",141 The Seventh Circuit approved
the district court's finding that Field was given the opportunity to have a full
hearing regarding his qualifications for office at the May 6th meeting of the
magistrate committee. His failure to take advantage of it waived any
further hearing right he may have had.' 42
137. 503 F.2d at 777.
138. 492 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (7th Cir. 1974).
139. 503 F.2d at 777-78.
140. Id. at 778.
141. Id., quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972).
142. Id.
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Similarly, in Whitfield v. Illinois Board of Law Examiners,1 41 the court
determined that the nature of the right and the potential for abuse under the
circumstances did not justify special due process procedures. Plaintiff
Whitfield, a black law school graduate, brought a civil rights action against
the Board of Law Examiners and its individual members after he failed the
Illinois State Bar Examination for the fifth time. He argued that:
1) the bar examination is unconstitutional because it has no ra-
tional connection with an applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law; 2) he passed the examination and should be so certified; and
3) procedural due process requires that he be permitted to see
his exam papers and to compare them with model answers or
answers of successful applicants.14 4
Premissing its due process analysis on the proposition that at a mini-
mum the fourteenth amendment requires a state to employ fair practices in
processing applications for admission to the bar, the Seventh Circuit did not
believe that the requested procedures were constitutionally mandated. Giv-
en the availability of re-examination and assistance from the bar examiners
and the administrative burdens attendant to the imposing of new procedures,
the court concluded that the right to see exams and compare answers as well
as the right to a full hearing were not essential to due process.145
Whitfield also challenged the actions of the law examiners as violative
of his equal protection rights. He claimed that the Illinois Bar Examination
bore no rational connection with the applicant's fitness and capacity to
practice law. This theory was based upon his assertion that, with his "fine
academic and military record" and "extensive legal experience,"'1 46 he could
not have flunked so many times if the exam had a rational relation to fitness
and capacity to practice law. He relied on Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners,14 7 where the Supreme Court said: "A state can require high
standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its
143. 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974).
144. Id. at 476. On appeal Whitfield argued that he also should have been afforded
a full-blown adversary hearing. The court found it unnecessary to specifically consider
this question, since there was no allegation in the complaint that plaintiff ever requested
a hearing. Compare Suckle v. Madison General Hospital, 499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir.
1974).
145. Id. at 478. Several state courts have determined that a failing applicant should
be afforded rights to compare answers or have a hearing. 'See, e.g., Application of
Peterson, 459 P.2d 703 (Alas. 1969). However, the Seventh Circuit held that these
determinations "were made in the exercise of the court's supervisory powers. It is
axiomatic that the Fourteenth Amendment does not necessarily require those same
procedural safeguards which a legislature or court may consider desirable as a matter of
policy." 504 F.2d at 479.
146. Under Supreme Court Rule 711, plaintiff had been employed at various legal
aid clinics where he interviewed clients, prepared legal documents, and litigated cases.
In addition, he was also employed as "Legal Advisor, special policeman and Project
Director" of the Gary, Indiana, Police Department.
147. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have
a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law.," 48
Rejecting all of his contentions, the Seventh Circuit observed that even
if Whitfield's background established his ability to practice law, the fact that
one qualified individual failed does not mean that the exam bears no rational
connection to fitness and capacity.
It is well settled that the question of whether a classification passes
constitutional muster cannot be answered simply by assessing its
chance effect upon a particular individual. As the Supreme Court
has concluded: "[T]he fact that the Rules [concerning admission
to the bar] may result in 'incidental individual inequality' [does
not] make them offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 49
Since the authority to determine admissibility has been exclusively
delegated to the Illinois Board of Law Examiners,'" 0 the court believed that
it could not interfere with the Board's determination absent proof that its
action was based on a constitutionally impermissible reason.151 Although
Whitfield claimed that his examination was graded arbitrarily, the Seventh
Circuit readily recognized that an essay-type examination requires subjective
evaluation where standards are not susceptible to precise definition.
Appellate courts in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have affirmatively
concluded that essay-type bar examinations have a rational connection
with the capacity to practice law. 152 Likewise, in Rasulis v. Weinberger,'53
Judge Tone said: "Educational requirements and proficiency examinations
are time-tested means of assuring that practitioners meet minimum standards
of competence.' 54  Moreover, state courts have consistently approved
essay exams and have refused to perform the role of "super bar examiner"
by regrading or reviewing them. 155 Because Whitfield's attack on the
rationality of the Illinois State Bar Examination was based solely on a
chance effect and because the allegation of subjective grading was unsub-
stantiated, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim for federal
constitutional relief. 156
148. Id. at 239.
149. 504 F.2d at 476 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S.
404, 436 (1935); Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961), where the Court said: "Mhe
fact that the Rules may result in 'incidental individual inequality' [does not] make them
offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 26.
150. ILL. S. Cr. R. 709. See Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923).
151. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-40, 248-49 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); cf. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957).
152. Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 699, 705 (8th Cir. 1971);
Chaney v. State Bar of California, 386 F.2d 962, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1011 (1968). See also Application of Brewer, 430 P.2d 150, 152 (Alas. 1967).
153. 502 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1974).
154. ld. at 1010.
155. See Annot., 39 A.L.R. 3d 719.
156. 504 F.2d at 478.
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Equal Protection
It is evident that the Constitution does not prohibit the government
from treating different people differently. Only where the classification
bears no reasonable relation to the legitimate end sought to be achieved will
disparate treatment be reviewed for arbitrariness and possible violations of
the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. Three Seventh Circuit
opinions last term illustrate the mechanics of this review.
In Stanton v. Bond,157 Indiana's failure to aggressively implement the
Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) provision
of the Social Security Act was found to constitute a denial of equal
protection. 15 8  EPSDT is part of a federally-funded, state-administered,
comprehensive medical assistance program for the needy established by Title
XIX of the Social Security Act.' 59 The 1967 amendment to the Act and
the federal regulations implementing the amendment stipulate that each
participating state furnish to eligible persons:
[S]uch early and periodic screening and diagnosis of individuals
who are eligible under -the plan and are under the age of 21 to as-
certain their physical or mental defects, and such health care,
treatment, and other measures to correct or ameliorate defects
and chronic conditions discovered thereby, as may be provided
in the regulations of the Secretary.' 60
These regulations seek to insure that those eligible know of their rights and
are able to take advantage of them.' 6 '
Louise Bond, representing the class of persons under the age of 21 who
are eligible for medical benefits under the EPSDT plan, brought suit
challenging Indiana's failure to implement the mandatory health program for
needy children. Although Indiana is a participating state in the program, its
compliance with the provisions of EPSDT amounted to granting the medical
assistance upon request. No agency was set up to administer the plan. Nor
were recipients specifically notified of the existence of the plan. The district
court entered summary judgment for plaintiffs and issued a mandatory
injunction to compel compliance by the state. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
In a unanimous opinion, the court first took notice of the growing need
for child health care among the poor and the urgency of preventive health
measures which gave rise to enactment of the EPSDT program. Although it
found that "[t]he mandatory obligation upon each participating state to
157. 504 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1974).
158. Id. at 1251.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 etseq. (1970).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 d (a)(4)(B) (1970) and 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)-(b)(4)(ii)
(1974).
161. 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(3)(i)-(ii) (1974). See 42 U.S.C. § 603(g) (Supp.
1972) (effective Oct. 20, 1972).
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aggressively notify, seek out and screen persons under 21 in order to detect
health problems and to pursue those problems with the needed treatment is
made unambiguously clear by the 1967 act and by the interpretative
regulations and guidelines,"' 62 the court noted that Indiana made little, if
any, effort to implement the program. Because "Indiana's casual approach
hardly conforms to the aggressive search for early detection of child health
problems envisaged by Congress," the Seventh Circuit allowed the mandato-
ry injunction to stand, reasoning that it was unlikely that needy children or
their parents would volunteer themselves for screening. 163 Further, the court
found injunctive relief proper where, as here, a state has not developed a
plan conforming to the guidelines attached to the grant of federal money.
In an analogous case, Nickerson v. Thompson, 6 4 the court was
confronted with a state's failure to implement an assistance program which
included special education facilities for children between the ages of three
and twenty-one who have certain enumerated handicaps.' 6 5 The class-
representative plaintiffs were five students requiring special education in
Evanston High School and its primary feeder school. Plaintiffs alleged that
defendant Superintendent of the Evanston school district failed to implement
the special education programs established by state law and misallocated the
resources of the special education programs that did exist.
The district court abstained, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded. Although most of its opinion dealt with the abstention issue, the
court held that "the statute clearly imposes a mandatory duty on defendants
to establish and maintain needed special educational facilities" and concluded
that:
On remand the district court must proceed to try plaintiffs' claim
that defendant's administration of the Illinois statutes dealing with
special education violates the Fourteenth Amendment. If the court
finds such a violation, it should order that the distribution of the
special education resources presently available be made in accord-
ance with the Constitution.' 66
162. 504 F.2d at 1250.
163. Id. at 1251.
164. 504 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974).
165. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-4.01 (1973); Rules and Regulations of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, art. II, § 2.01-.02, art. m, § 3.01, art. IX, § 9.01-
.02. Art. III, § 3.01 provides:
Each local school district shall establish and maintain special education
instructional programs and supportive services which meet the educational
needs of children with the following exceptional characteristics:
1. Auditory, visual, physical, or health impairment
2. Speech or language impairment
3. Deficits in the essential learning processes of perception, memory, at-
tention, or motor control
4. Deficits in intellectual development and mental capacity
5. Educational maladjustment related to social or cultural circumstances
6. Affective disorders or adaptive behavior which restricts effective func-
tioning ...
166. 504 F.2d at 816-17.
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Stanton and Nickerson illustrate that, where a statute grants benefits to
individuals, the state must use all reasonable means available to implement
the benefit programs. Failure to do so will subject the responsible officials
to a civil rights claim.
It should be borne in mind that not every violation of statutory law is
also a violation of equal protection. In Schreiber v. Lugar,167 several
taxpayers brought an action to enjoin expenditure of $4.4 million for the
construction of an indoor sports arena in Indianapolis, Indiana. Plaintiffs
claimed that the stadium construction was not authorized by Indiana law and
that the use of federal revenue sharing funds would violate the Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972.168 Attempting to assert federal civil rights jurisdic-
tion on a violation of the Civil Rights Act,169 plaintiffs contended that their
statutory right to have public funds disbursed lawfully was violated, contrary
to the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. The Seventh
Circuit flatly rejected this argument by saying: "If this expansive theory is
adequate to create federal jurisdiction over this dispute, federal judges surely
have bootstraps that will enable them to stand on their own shoulders.' 70
To succeed on an equal protection claim, then, it must be shown either
that the classification itself is based upon an arbitrary distinction or that
the application of the disparate treatment is not reasonably related to the
protection of the social interest which motivated the classification. To insure
rights basic to a free society when the challenged treatment infringes upon a
fundamental right or when the class distinction is inherently suspect, the
interest requiring protection must be shown to be compelling.
In another decision rendered last term, the Seventh Circuit demonstrat-
ed its sympathies for fundamental liberties in the context of a voting rights
case. In Communist Party of Illinois v. State Board of Elections,17' a vote
signature law was declared unconstitutional because the classification
presented did not bear a reasonable relationship to the promotion of a
compelling and legitimate state goal. The Illinois Election Code, section 10-
2, required any political parties seeking statewide ballot recognition to
submit petitions containing not less than 25,000 signatures of qualified voters,
not more than 13,000 of which may be counted from any one county.' 72
Accordingly, a political party seeking to place its name on a state ballot
needed support from at least one county, outside Cook County, with the total
required support being 12,000 votes. The Communist Party of Illinois,
several of its candidates for state office in the 1974 general elections, and a
registered voter desiring to vote for these candidates filed a civil rights claim
167. 518 F.2d 1099 (7th Cir. 1975).
168. 518 F.2d at 1101 n.3.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
170. 518 F.2d at 1105.
171. 518 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 394 (1975).
172. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-2 (1973).
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challenging the constitutionality of this section and seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.
The district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, finding that section 10-2
violated equal protection and due process because "it discriminates against
voters of the most populous county of the state in favor of voters in the less
populous counties."1 73 The state appealed to the Seventh Circuit, contend-
ing that the two county signature rule was a non-arbitrary attempt to assure
that all Illinois residents have "equal opportunity to be involved in statewide
political party activities" and that "multifarious political associations with
little or no popular support do not bemuse the electorial process." The court
relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Moore v. Ogilvie,174 which held
a predecessor of section 10-2 unconstitutional, and affirmed the district
court.
Moore overturned an Illinois statutory provision which required inde-
pendent candidates seeking certification for the statewide ballot to obtain
signatures of 200 voters from each of at least fifty counties in making up the
25,000 signatures necessary. The Supreme Court framed the equal protec-
tion problem by saying:
It is no answer to the argument under the Equal Protection
Clause that this law was designed to require statewide support for
launching a new political party rather than support from a few
localities. This law applies a rigid, arbitrary formula to sparsely
settled counties and populous counties alike, contrary to the con-
stitutional theme of equality among citizens in the exercise of their
political rights. The idea that one group can be granted greater
voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote
basis of our representative government.
Under this Illinois law the electorate in 49 of the counties
which contained 93.4% of the registered voters may not form a
new political party and place its candidates on the ballot. Yet
25,000 of the remaining 6.6% of registered voters properly dis-
tributed among the 53 remaining counties may form a new party
to elect candidates to office. This law thus discriminates against
the residents of the populous counties of the State in favor of rural
sections. It, therefore, lacks the equality to which the exercise of
political rights is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. 175
The Seventh Circuit analogized the new provision to the one in Moore.
Under new section 10-2, the 2,750,000 registered voters-45 percent of the
total electorate-who live in urbanized Cook County may not, standing
alone, form a new statewide political party to protect their own peculiar
interests, while 25,000 voters of the remaining 55 percent of the total
173. 518 F.2d at 518.
174. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
175. 394 U.S. at 818-19.
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electorate may, if from two or more counties, "create such a party to advance
their distinctly different, and often competing, interests."' 17 6
Noting that section 10-2 directly affects the fundamental right to vote,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the state's contention that the county distribution
requirement with its dilution of the vote strength of "concentrated Chicago"
is necessary to prevent laundry list ballots confusing and demeaning to the
statewide electorial process and demanded a showing by defendants of a
compelling state interest to justify the class distinction.
Assuming that a compelling need exists in Illinois to "protect the
integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent
candidacies," we cannot see how this interest is tied by necessity
to a discriminatory diminution of the power of the individual voter
in Cook County, or any other urbanized county. Similarly, if there
is a permissible and compelling state interest in limiting the total
number of candidates or parties on the statewide ballot independent
of the question of the seriousness or legitimacy of such candidates
or parties, some method is surely available which will serve this
interest without making the effectiveness of an Illinois citizen's
electoral power depend on his geographical location within that
state.
177
Because the county distribution requirement of section 10-2 "lacks the
equality to which the exercise of political rights is entitled under the
Fourteenth Amendment," the court held the provision violative of the
Communist Party's right to equal protection under the law. 1 78
DIsCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
For the past decade, the Seventh Circuit has found itself immersed in
race discrimination in housing suits. Much of the controversy that has
reached the appellate level has been the result of the efforts of Judge
Richard B. Austin in combatting entrenched patterns of segregation.
1 79
Housing discrimination was a prominent topic in the Seventh Circuit
last term. Two decisions-Moore v. Townsend'8 0 and Hairston v. R & R
Apartments'8 1-provide revealing insights into the court's position on racial
discrimination in the sale and rental of private property.
In Moore, defendant Townsend listed her south side Chicago home for
sale with Jean Spencer Real Estate, Inc., which employed defendant Mel-
176. 528 F.2d at 521.
177. Id., citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1968). See Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334-43 (1972).
178. 518 F.2d at 521-22, quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. at 819.
179. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (1974); 436 F.2d 306,
stay denied, 401 U.S. 953 (1971); 342 F. Supp. 827 (1972); 304 F. Supp. 736 (1969);
296 F. Supp. 907 (1969); 265 F. Supp. 582 (1967).
180. 525 F.2d 482 (1975).
181. 510 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1975).
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nick. In March 1974, plaintiffs, a black federal employee and his wife,
were shown the Townsend house and made a purchase offer of $70,000.
Broker Melnick informed the Moores that their offer was rejected, but that
Townsend countered with an $80,000 purchase price. The Moores then
offered a standard form contract for $77,000. On March 26, Melnick
informed plaintiffs that Townsend had signed and accepted their proposal.
On March 28, Melnick told the Moores that Townsend had decided not to
sell her home and had directed her not to deliver the executed contract.
Three days later, Melnick repeated that she had the signed contract, but
refused to give it to the Moores or to allow them to inspect it. Subsequently,
Melnick stated a community group had pressured her about showing the
Townsend property to Negros. On April 2, Melnick reiterated that the
$77,000 contract had been signed, but said that she had mutilated it by
cutting off and destroying Townsend's signature.
The Moores, represented without fee by the Leadership Council for
Metropolitan Open Communities, a fair housing organization, brought an
action charging Townsend and Melnick with racial discrimination and
seeking specific performance on the $77,000 contract. After an extensive
hearing, the district court entered a preliminary injunction on April 16,
1974, restraining pendente lite the sale of the property to anyone other
than the Moores. At a trial of the merits in June 1974, the court
found that there was an executed contract for sale of the home, held
that the motives in avoiding the contract were racially discriminatory, and
ordered sale of the property. Despite the fact that plaintiffs' income
exceeded $28,000 per year, their motion for attorneys' fees and costs was
granted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court's fact
finding was not clearly erroneous.' 8 2 Considering the particular factual find-
ings in the case, the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of the merits seems proper.
However, the grant of fees and costs was questionable. The facts simply do
not support the district court's conclusion that Moore, a federal employee at
the GS-13 rating, was financially unable to assume attorneys' fees.
Defendants' alternative argument against the award of fees-that no
grant should be made since the Leadership Council offered its services free
to the Moores-was rejected in this case and indeed has been foreclosed since
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hairston v. R & R Apartments.88 There
182. 525 F.2d at 486.
183. 510 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1975). See Jeanty v. McKey and Poague, Inc., 496
F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974); Brandenburg v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974);
Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises,
Inc., 426 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970); Lea v. Gen-Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir.
1972); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Note, Award of Attor-
neys' Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARv. L. REv. 411 (1973). See also Lee v. Southern
Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st
Cir. 1972).
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the court joined other circuits in awarding fees to legal aid offices.
Quoting from Brandenburger v. Thompson, 8 4 the court said:
[T]he fact that the plaintiff was not obligated to pay the ACLU
for its services is not a bar to an award of attorneys' fees. All that
is required is the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
The policy underlying the "private attorney general" doctrine
supports this conclusion. It is true that the prospect of attorney's
fees does not discourage the litigant from bringing suit when legal
representation is provided without charge. But the entity provid-
ing the free legal services will be so discouraged, and an award of
attorneys' fees encourages it to bring public-minded suits when so
requested by litigants who are unable to pay. Thus, an award
of attorneys' fees to the organization providing free legal services
indirectly serves the same purpose as an award directly to a fee
paying litigant.'185
And Senior Judge Castle wrote:
Consequently, the grant of fees does accrue to the benefit of
the plaintiff by assuring vigorous enforcement of the Fair Housing
Act. So long as the plaintiff is unable to afford the cost of litiga-
tion, we see no reason to reduce the level of that enforcement by
attaching significance to a formalized obligation to pay, and thus,
in light of the purpose served by an award of fees, we find that an
organization providing free legal services stands in the same posi-
tion as a private attorney to whom a fee is owed. To avoid any
windfall, however, the grant of fees should go directly to the organi-
zation providing the services.' 8 6
In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit remanded Hairston for a "determination
of a reasonable fee for services."
Surprisingly, the fee-granting theory has been employed with admirable
circumspection. In Sprogis v. United Air Lines,'87 a sex discrimination case,
the court refused a fees request from a labor organization that had provided
legal assistance without informing the district court of its involvement and
after it had entered into a consent agreement with defendants on virtually
the same issues involved.'8 8
In the low income housing sphere, the Seventh Circuit has been most
aggressive and assertive. Indeed, without question, its most extraordinary
civil rights decision of the term is Metropolitan Housing Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights.'89  Stretching constitutional principles to their break-
ing point, the court found Arlington Heights, a predominently white suburb
of Chicago, to be legally obligated to remedy a situation which it neither
created nor fostered.
184. 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974).
185. 510 F.2d at 1092-93.
186. Id. at 1093 (citation omitted).
187. 517 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975).
188. Id. at 391-92.
189. 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 46 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1975).
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In 1971, the Clerics of St. Viator leased, on a long-term basis, fifteen
acres of vacant property in Arlington Heights to Metropolitan Housing, a
non-profit corporation organized to develop low-to-moderate income housing
for the Chicago metropolitan area. Metropolitan proposed to use the land,
which had always been zoned for single-family dwellings, for a multi-family
townhouse development to be called "Lincoln Green." Upon Metropolitan's
application for an appropriate zoning change, the Village conducted hear-
ings, made and studied various traffic, tax, and school use reports, and
rejected the request on the ground that the site was surrounded by single
family units and that the development was not consistent with the previously-
established "Comprehensive Plan" of Arlington Heights. The Comprehensive
Plan, adopted in 1959 and generally followed since then, provided that an
area should be zoned for multiple family dwellings only when it serves as a
"buffer" or transition between single-family zoning and commercial, industri-
al, or other high intensity uses.
In 1972, Metropolitan Housing sued the Village and various town
officials, contending that the refusal to rezone perpetuated existing patterns
of racial segregation and violated plaintiff's right to use its property in a
reasonable manner. After a trial on the merits, the district court entered
judgment for defendants. Upon examination of the proofs, the court found
that the Village's refusal to rezone was based solely upon its desire to
preserve the integrity of its Comprehensive Plan and that this was a good-
faith, non-discriminatory motivation which did not give rise to a racially-
discriminatory effect.'90
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding as immaterial the Village's
motives in rejecting the proposed zoning and its lack of participation in
creating or perpetuating a segregated community. In essence, the court
posited that, whenever a de facto condition of segregation exists, a munici-
pality-regardless of its involvement in the condition of segregation-is
constitutionally obligated to "eas[e] the problem" by affirmative action.
The court said:
Lincoln Green appears to be the only contemplated proposal for
Arlington Heights that would be a step in the direction of easing
the problem of de facto segregated housing. Thus, the rejection of
Lincoln Green has the effect of perpetuating both this residential
segregation and Arlington Heights' failure to accept any responsi-
bility for helping to solve this problem.' 9 '
. . . Merely because Arlington Heights did not directly create the
problem does not necessarily mean that it can ignore it.l92
190. Metropolitan Housing Dev. v. Village of Arlington Hgts., 373 F. Supp. 208
(N.D. IIl. 1973).
191. 517 F.2d at 414.
192. Id. See Clark v. Universal Builders, 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974); United
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Apparently, Arlington Heights' constitutional faux pas and the basis for this
conferral of liability was that it "allow[ed] itself to become an almost one
hundred percent white community." In any event, the court concluded that,
since the refusal to rezone had discriminatory effects that could not be
justified by any compelling state interest, plaintiffs were entitled to judgment
"in accordance with this opinion."193
Criticism of this unprecedented action is simple and direct. By its
action, the Seventh Circuit created a double standard of constitutional law
and rendered the Constitution a "color-minded," rather than a "color-blind,"
document. Henceforth, entities that have engaged in no unlawful or
impermissible activity and that have no material independent legal duties
will have an affirmative constitutional obligation to rectify segregation
wherever it is found. Under this theory of judicial legislation, the court
perceived the existence of a "social problem" and unilaterally assigned the
task of its solution to the unsuspecting Village of Arlington Heights.
PUBLIC OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Public official immunity and discretion has been a recurring topic of
controversy for the Seventh Circuit.' 94  Last term, the court continued to
define the range of activities in which government agents may engage
without fear of judicial intervention or personal liability for damages in civil
rights suits.
Before examining the cases, however, a prefatory comment is in order.
Civil immunization of government officers for civil rights violations is
premised upon the notion that public officials should not be penalized for
decisions made in the ordinary course of their duties. 195 In fashioning an
immunity test, the court has judiciously observed that "the proper focus [of
judicial examination] is upon the character of [a] defendant's conduct
rather than his motivation."'196 A contrary holding would subject office-
Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 810-11
(5th Cir. 1974).
193. 517 F.2d at 415.
194. See, e.g., Skolnick v. Campbell, 398 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1968); Skolnick v.
Hanrahan, 398 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1968); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th
Cir. 1972), rev. sub. nom., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
195. Speaking of judicial immunity in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the
Supreme Court said: "This immunity is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious
or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of
consequences." Id. at 554. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335 (1872); Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868).
196. Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449, 450 (7th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff brought civil
rights action for false imprisonment after two witnesses retracted identification of
plaintiff which had resulted in his arrest for armed robbery). See Hampton v. City of
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holders to repeated reappraisals of their subjective intentions in the conduct
of their official functions. Not only would such cross-examination be unduly
disruptive of the orderly process of government, it would also deter qualified
individuals from entering public service and would force officeholders to
continually confront the possibility of financial loss for any error of judgment
that they may make. Referring to these considerations, the court has
carefully enunciated its immunity rules.
In Boyd v. Adams,197 plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile that
was stopped by Chicago policemen. The police allegedly abused Boyd and
wrongfully arrested her for disorderly conduct and resisting a police officer.
When she appeared in state court for trial, plaintiff and her attorney
proposed and consummated a deal with defendant Assistant State's attorney
Kayman, whereby all criminal charges against Boyd would be dismissed in
exchange for a release of all claims against the police officers and the City of
Chicago. On advice of counsel, plaintiff executed a preprinted release form,
supplied by the State's attorney's Office. The charges were dropped.
Boyd filed her civil rights action against the arresting officers, the
Superintendent of Police, the City of Chicago, Kayman, and the Cook
County State's attorney Edward Hanrahan. The suit sought a judicial
declaration that the release was void as well as money damages for the
illegal search and arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. Most
important, at least for present purposes, Boyd requested an injunction
against the State's attorney prohibiting the practice of dismissing criminal
charges in return for releases of civil liability.
The district court conducted a hearing on the voluntariness of the
release, found it valid, and entered judgment for the police and the city.
Defendants Kayman and Hanrahan were held entitled to prosecutorial
immunity and were dismissed.' 98
In a unanimous decision, the court of appeals reversed. Despite an
uncontested district court finding that Boyd's waiver was made on advice of
counsel, the court declared the release void as a matter of law because
it "was secured in such an inherently coercive contest that plaintiff did not
effectively waive her civil rights action against defendants." 99 Plaintiff's
civil rights claims against the arresting policemen were deemed actionable
and were remanded to the district court for trial.
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536-37
(9th Cir. 1965); Comment, Civil Rights-Section 1983-Prosecuting Attorney Held
Immune From Civil Liability for Violation of Civil Rights Act, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 160,
162-63 (1967).
197. 513 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975).
198. 364 F. Supp. 1180 (N.D. Il. 1973).
199. 513 F.2d at 88.
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While affirming the prosecutors' immunity from monetary liability
under the civil rights laws, the Seventh Circuit broke new ground by ruling
that official immunity does not bar injunctive relief against government
agents acting beyond the scope of their authority. Relying on a concurring
opinion in Connover v. Montemuro,2 0 0 a case which arrived at similar
conclusions as to judicial immunity, and the absence of "any directly contrary
precedent, 20 1 the court reasoned that
Prospective, prohibitory injunctions, such as those sought here
• . . will, if granted, only order defendant prosecutors to conform
their conduct to the dictates of the law. No personal financial
risk is involved, nor should any person be deterred from public
service because of the possibility that a court may order him to
conform his future conduct to the law. 202
This decision is both sound and welcome. To hold otherwise would create a
permanent and insurmountable barrier to relief from continued unconstitu-
tional activity. Boyd forewarns wrongdoing government officials that the
federal courts will impose constitutional limitations upon their authority,
wherever appropriate.203
The difficulty with Boyd is its reliance upon Connover and its failure to
recognize and resolve a possible conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in
O'Shea v. Littleton.20 4 The suit in Connover was brought to enjoin certain
alleged due process violations in the conduct of the Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania Family Court. The district court abstained from judgment and the
Third Circuit reversed, holding abstention to be improper under the circum-
stances. 205 The en banc majority specifically and unequivocally refused to
decide whether judicial immunity barred injunctive relief against an alleged
pattern of unconstitutional activity. In a masterful concurring opinion,
200. 477 F.2d 1073, 1096-1144 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
201. 513 F.2d at 86.
202. Id. at 86.
203. Similarly, in Calvin v. Conlisk, 367 F. Supp. 476, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1975), the
court approved the use of injunctive relief against alleged widespread and continued
brutality by Chicago policemen.
204. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
205. The Third Circuit said:
In determining whether or not ... a federal court should on equitable princi-
ples enjoin a state court criminal prosecution, the federal equity court must
take into account the available remedy at law of raising the federal constitu-
tional claim in the pending state proceeding. That available remedy at law
in the state court, when weighed with the comity due to a court of coordinate
sovereignty will, in the absence of additional exceptional circumstances, always
militate against the issuance of an injunction halting or interfering with the
state prosecution ...
The purpose of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Acts was to provide a
federal forum for the enforcement of federal rights. Where an adjudication
of those rights rests heavily on a factual determination, the ultimate responsibil-
ity for making this determination lies with the article III courts.
477 F.2d at 1080-81 (citation omitted).
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Judge Gibbons examined the issue and concluded that the principles of
immunization were not controlling in the context of equitable relief. 20 6
Although Judge Gibbons' analysis is well-reasoned, it was substantially
eroded by the Supreme Court's Littleton decision.
Littleton presented a factual situation similar to Connover: Illinois
citizens sought to enjoin constitutional deprivations in sentencing by Illinois
state judges. The district court found no jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit
disagreed, and the Supreme Court reversed on standing grounds. Although
it is mere dicta and inconclusive, the Supreme Court's discussion of judicial
immunity and the availability of the injunctive remedy is revealing. While
not eliminating equitable relief under all circumstances, the Court exhibited
an extreme reluctance to enjoin state judges when such an injunction would
be "[an] unwarranted . . . interference [in the state court system] by means
of continuous or piecemeal interruptions of . . . state proceedings by litiga-
tion in the federal courts"20 7 and when "there are available state and federal
procedures which could provide relief from the wrongful conduct al-
leged." 208
In short, the Connover rationale has been severely limited by Littleton
and provides a flimsy basis for Boyd. Support may be found in Littleton
itself, however, since the injunctive relief granted in Boyd was neither an
"unwarranted interference" in a comity sense nor a continued interference
in the prosecutor's function or discretion. The federalism-comity problems
of Connover and Littleton were simply not present there.
Two additional police cases complete the immunity picture. In Bru-
baker v. King,20 9 plaintiff sued local police officers and federal Treasury
and Postal agents for conducting a warrantless mail intercept which produced
a large quantity of hashish. Brubaker contended that the government
lacked probable cause to believe that he had knowledge of the existence and
illicit nature of the hashish. Defendants, for their part, filed uncontraverted
affidavits attesting that they had a reasonable belief that plaintiff acted
unlawfully and that the search and arrest were made with a good faith belief
in their constitutional validity. Judgment was entered for defendants and
the plaintiff appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding, as it did in
Tritsis v. Backer:210
[T]o prevail the police officer need not allege and prove probable
cause in the constitutional sense. The standard governing police
conduct is composed of two elements, the first is subjective and the
206. Id. at 1100-04. See also Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Jacobson v. Schaefer, 441 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1971);
Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970).
207. 414 U.S. at 500. See Steffanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Cleary v.
Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961).
208. 414 U.S. at 502. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
209. 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975).
210. 501 F.2d 1021, 1022-23 (7th Cir. 1974),
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second is objective. Thus the officer must allege and prove not
only that he believed, in good faith, that his conduct was lawful,
but also that his belief was reasonable. 211
This standard was reiterated by another appellate court panel in
Boscarino v. Nelson.21 2 Boscarino, an ex-convict and a known burglar, was
seen "lurking about" buildings in a Milwaukee residential district. Defend-
ant Nelson, an off-duty policeman, observed this action and stopped and
searched Boscarino. Finding burglary tools, he charged Boscarino with
burglary, possession of the tools, and carrying a concealed weapon. Subse-
quently, all charges against Boscarino were dismissed on the ground that
there was no probable cause for the search or arrest. This action ensued.
After a trial on the merits, the district court found defendant guilty of a
deprivation of plaintiff's fourth amendment rights. 21 3  In so holding, the
court relied upon the 1968 Seventh Circuit decision of Joseph v. Rowlan,214
which held that "where a police officer makes an arrest which is unlawful
under the federal constitution because [it was] made without a warrant and
without probable cause . . . section 1983 imposes on the officer a liability
which is recoverable in federal court. '215
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and disavowed, in no uncertain
terms, its Rowlan decision. Reemphasizing its adoption of the Bivens
standard, the court stated:
In Tritsis v. Backer. . . this Court expressly followed the Second
Circuit's holding in Bivens that if a police officer could show that
he acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the validity
of the arrest and search, he would have a valid defense to a suit
for damages like this one. 21 6
CONCLUSION
Immunity was the last stage in this examination of the Seventh Circuit's
decisions. And it seems a fitting conclusion. The court's position on
immunity reminds the reader that the "liberal" Seventh Circuit is always
practical. Although it vigorously supports civil rights and liberties, it is
extremely reluctant to penalize wrongdoing state officials by granting money
damages to even the most aggrieved party.
211. 505 F.2d at 537.
212. 518 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1975).
213. Boscarino v. Nelson, 377 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
214. 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968).
215. Id. at 370.
216. 518 F.2d at 887.
